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PREFACE 
 
I will not lie to you.  A sixty-page thesis requirement for graduation from the James 
Madison University Honors College seemed incredibly daunting just one year ago.  I struggled to 
believe I would find the time or the desire to complete this project, nor did I believe I would find 
a topic so interesting I would meet the minimum page requirement.  Now here I sit, just days 
from graduation, with a published thesis whose completion I doubted more than once, but whose 
submission brings me much happiness and pride.   
Last spring, I searched my brain for topics I found intriguing and with which I could 
spend the next twelve months researching and writing about.  I presented a shortened list to Dr. 
Hyser who in turn kindly, but very smartly, turned them away, predicting my topics would be 
either too narrow with too little existing research, too broad with too many sources to sift 
through, or simply too mundane that I would lose interest over the summer.  In hindsight, I thank 
him for his harsh, but much needed and much appreciated comments during our spring meetings.   
As a result, I returned home to my apartment back at square one.  I simply opened my 
computer and searched “US controversies” to see if anything of interest would spark fresh ideas 
and lead to a new research trail I could hop on.  The role of the United States in the modern 
Middle East naturally appeared as one of the common themes throughout the lists of 
controversial United States’ events and as I dug deeper I learned of the origins of our relationship 
with Iraq in the 1980s.  I knew absolutely nothing about the Iran-Iraq War at this point, but 
quickly learned of Saddam Hussein’s infamous use of chemical weapons during the conflict.  
The attack on Halabja was mentioned in every article I read and headlined most of my search 
results.  I was stunned to hear about the genocide, and appalled after seeing some of the 
	 6 
photographs taken prior to the removal of the bodies from the town.  The event had caught my 
attention and was enough to encourage me to complete the project proposal due that same week.  
I had barely hit my first deadline and was already prepared to take some time off from the thesis 
and enjoy my last summer of college.   
As a third-year cadet in Army ROTC at James Madison University I attended training at 
Fort Knox, Kentucky that summer.  Part of that training takes place in a simulated toxic 
environment where cadets are evaluated on their ability to properly put on Mission Oriented 
Protective Posture (MOPP) Gear to protect themselves in a CBRN (Chemical, Biological, 
Radiological, Nuclear) setting.  Once properly equipped, cadets are sent through the gas chamber 
where they are exposed to tear gas.  We were first asked to partially unzip our jacket and uncover 
our necks so we could feel the tingling, burning sensation as the gas settles on open skin.  At this 
point, I could still breathe normally, as my gas mask was tightly fitted around my face.  We were 
then taken one by one with an experienced instructor who had us remove our gas masks; state 
our name, rank, and birthday; and sing our favorite song.  I made it through half of the chorus of 
Katy Perry’s “Firework” before I could no longer speak, breathe, or see.  My eyes burned and 
watered more than they ever had before.  My mouth and nose dripped with drool and snot as my 
sinuses discharged anything they could find in an attempt to expel the gas from my airways.  I 
had completed this same event and walked through this same chamber two years prior at a 
similar training course, but this year was different.  At this point during my first experience I had 
been escorted from the chamber and allowed outside where five minutes of clean air, disciplined 
breathing, and consistent flapping of my arms to prevent the rubbing of my eyes were all I 
needed to recover.  This summer, however, we were ordered to sing our song until the instructor 
allowed us to again don our gas masks.  I underestimated the fear that would race through my 
	 7 
body as I tried to clear the air out of my lungs and my mask.  The thirty seconds it took me to 
clear out the gas and allow the filter to work again felt like minutes, and it was one of the few 
times in my life where I have felt true panic.  All you want to do in that situation is keep 
breathing in hopes that you will take in fresh air, but only end up breathing in more contaminated 
air.  Instead, you are required to exhale through your mask to clear out the gas and then breathe 
in and let the filter offer you the oxygen your body needs.  You must trust your equipment rather 
than your natural instinct of hyperventilation.   
After each cadet recovered, we again took off our gas masks, went through the painful 
process of running around the chamber in a circle each crying, spitting, and in my squad-mate’s 
case vomiting, until we were led outside.  Even though I had experienced this training two years 
prior, I was unprepared and had forgotten what it felt like.  This time, however, I will not forget.  
I remember my thought process as I followed my buddies in a circle flapping my arms and 
blowing out whatever was left in my nose.  “This was only tear gas,” I recall telling myself.  
Through the minimal research I had done up to this point I understood tear gas was simply a riot 
control agent and at the bottom of the list of chemical agents used in war in terms of potency.  “If 
this is the least painful agent, how must people feel when they come into contact with mustard 
gas or phosgene, or any of the nerve agents I’ve read about?”  I could not even fathom the pain 
and the panic the people of Halabja must have felt as they realized what had just fallen from the 
sky on the morning of March 16, 1988.  The distance between bodies and the town show the fear 
some felt as they took flight towards fresh air in the mountains.  The bodily contortions illustrate 
the pain the victims felt as they succumbed to the gas.  The huddled masses of parents 
frivolously attempting to protect their children from the toxic fumes display the futility and 
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desperation that struck those left in the town.  What they wouldn’t have done for the equipment I 
wore as I cried my eyes out over tear gas.   
This single life event gave me the motivation to conduct research on these chemical 
agents and the effects they had on the war and those unlucky enough to fight in it.  That gas 
chamber encouraged me to complete this year-long process and write a thesis that I no longer 
viewed as a requirement, but rather as a privilege.  Though at times, I wished this was a project I 
had not undertaken, I am thankful to have learned so much and hope that I have been able to give 
the citizens of Halabja some more of the recognition and justice they deserve.  Representing 
them and the horrifying crises they went through were the initial goal of this monograph.  Since 
then, it has grown into a condemnation of Saddam Hussein, the United States, the United 
Nations, and the Ayatollah Khomeini and their shared blame for the Anfal Campaign and the 
Halabja Massacre.   
In order to reach this objective, I have broken my thesis into five chapters, each with a 
new focus.  Chapter One explores the history of chemical warfare from its premier usage on a 
major scale in World War I to its role in the Iran-Iraq War.  The development of these weapons 
and the changing nature of their deployment on the battlefield are evaluated as well as the 
attempts by the international community to regulate and prohibit chemical warfare throughout 
the same period.  The chapter also highlights the four main types of chemical agents used in war 
and their effects on the human body.   
Throughout the second chapter the historical conflicts between the nations of Iran and 
Iraq are described in order to provide a cultural backdrop against which the Iran-Iraq war can be 
understood.  The main body of this chapter focuses on the first seven years of the war, examining 
the war’s origins, the global trade networks, the military operations, and the thought processes of 
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international leaders.  In this chapter, the reader will find the initial uses of chemical warfare by 
Saddam Hussein.  This chapter focuses on chemical weapons used against Iranians.  The third 
chapter, on the contrary, focuses on the use of these weapons against the Kurdish population 
within the northern provinces of Iraq during the Anfal campaigns in 1987 and 1988.  The 
Halabja Massacre and the role of the Kurds in the war are largely discussed in this chapter. 
Chapter Four argues the United Nations and the United States failed to effectively 
denounce the use of poison gas in the war and criticizes the international community for creating 
an environment in which Saddam Hussein could launch the Anfal campaign without 
condemnation.  It details the multiple UN resolutions passed during the war’s eight years and 
why those resolutions were ineffective.  The chapter also explains the debates occurring in the 
United States government and the reasons behind the decisions it made in regards to Iraq’s use of 
chemical weapons.  Finally, the chapter closes by contending the ineffectiveness of the 
international community and the lack of condemnation or punishment against Iraq for their 
genocidal Anfal campaign led to Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991.  The Epilogue 
of my thesis wraps up the end of the war and analyzes the first effective role of international 
commissions in regulating the chemical weapons program in Iraq.  It describes the trial and death 
of Saddam Hussein and explains why the use of chemical weapons in this war differs from 
previous conflicts. 
 While this thesis required extensive research it is by no means complete.  I regret that I 
had to meet the deadlines set by the university for there is much more research to be done and 
much more to write.  The myriad accounts of Kurds at Halabja deserve to be heard by the world.  
This thesis, I hope, offers enough of their voice and condemns those for taking away the voices 
of their family members, friends, and neighbors.  Their sacrifice should not be forgotten.      
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1 Joost R. Hiltermann, A Poisonous Affair: America, Iraq, and the Gassing of Halabja (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), xxix. 
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1 
 A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHEMICAL WARFARE AND IRAQ 
 
Upon receiving the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 1919, German professor and chemist 
Fritz Haber properly concluded that “In no future war will the military be able to ignore poison 
gas for it is a higher form of killing.”  His statement, almost a century old, refers to an 
undeniable truth still applicable to today.  The use of chemical agents as a form of warfare is a 
modern horror known to millions of individuals, soldiers and civilians alike, who have been 
unfortunate enough to reside near military conflict within the last one hundred years.  Its 
asphyxiating, burning, and pain-inducing qualities, dependent upon the agent, have left 
battlefields and cities decimated and littered with any human, animal, or vegetation caught in the 
deadly clouds.  Since its premier use in the First World War, chemical warfare has developed at 
an incredible rate and has led to more toxic, more persistent, and more efficient weapons whose 
secrets continue to spread to more and more nations.  Due to the terrific effect these agents have 
on the human mind and body, international organizations have strived to control the research, 
development, manufacture, stockpiling, and deployment of chemicals as a means of war.  Their 
success in this endeavor has been limited, and there have been multiple occasions in which the 
use of chemical weapons has been confirmed beyond a doubt, as well as another myriad of 
occasions in which they were believed to have been used, but the evidence is inconclusive.  In 
her book, A History of Chemical Warfare, Kim Coleman identifies five confirmed instances in 
which chemical warfare has been used within the past ninety years.  These five, World War I, the 
Italian invasion of Ethiopia (1935-36), the Japanese invasion of China (1937-43), the United 
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States in Vietnam (1965-75), and the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), will be further expounded upon in 
hopes that a better understanding of the history of chemical agents in war can be reached. 2  
An understanding of the basics behind chemical agents and their transition from science 
to war is a good starting point.  Chemical warfare agents can be broken down into four 
categories: choking, blister, blood, and nerve agents.  Choking agents like carbonyl chloride and 
phosgene attack the respiratory system causing the lungs to fill with fluid and drowning the 
victim.  These agents are odorous and cause irritation of the airways which both act as early 
warning systems for the victim.  Because of these characteristics, choking agents allow the 
victims to apply gas masks quickly and are not used often.  Blister agents like Yperite, 
commonly known as mustard gas, attack exposed skin and cause large, watery blisters that can 
be easily infected.  These blister agents can be further categorized into arsenicals like Lewisite, 
which gives enough warning to don a gas mask, and mustards, which act quickly and do not 
allow time for preventative equipment.  Blood agents, like hydrogen cyanide, are inhaled and 
enter the bloodstream where they cause vital organs to quit functioning.  Finally, nerve agents 
work by preventing an enzyme called acetylcholinesterase from operating normally, which, in 
turn, causes an accumulation of acetylcholine (ACh), over-excitation, and eventually respiratory 
paralysis.  These do not occur naturally and are further broken down into G-Agents like tabun, 
sarin, and soman which cause death through inhalation, and the most lethal V-Agents like VX 
that are more persistent and can be absorbed through the skin.3 
																																																						
2 Kim Coleman, A History of Chemical Warfare (New York: Palgrace Macmillan Limited, 2005), xv, xx, accessed 
September 24, 2018, https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/jmu/detail.action?docID=257360.   
3 Coleman, 3-4; K. Ganesan, S.K. Raza, and R. Vijayaraghavan, “Chemical Warfare Agents,” Journal of Pharmacy 
and Bioallied Sciences, 2 (3), July-September 2010; 166-178, accessed March 14, 2019, 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3148621/. 
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The predecessors to these advanced chemical agents are found in the smoke screens, 
sleep-inducing fumes, and incendiary devices used in battles fought around 2000 BC.  The 
Spartans further developed this early technology in the Peloponnesian War, the Byzantines at the 
siege of Constantinople, and Leonardo da Vinci as he developed the first chemical weapon in the 
form of shells full of arsenic and sulfur meant to be shot at ships.  Primitive versions of chemical 
warfare continued to develop throughout the Middle Ages and by August 1675 the French and 
the Holy Roman Empire signed the Strasbourg Agreement ending the usage of poison bullets in 
conflict.  This milestone marked the first international agreement that prohibited chemical 
weapons in modern history.4 
By the time the First World War began, industrial chemistry had expanded and allowed 
major world powers to develop toxic chemicals for military use.  Britain believed sulfur dioxide 
clouds could be used on the offensive, the United States created an artillery shell full of 
hydrogen cyanide, France developed tear gas weapons, and Germany experimented with 
phosgene and arsenic-filled grenades.  As the war progressed, and trench warfare slowed the 
German offensive, both sides searched for a way to turn the tide.  At first, the main use of 
chemical weapons was not to kill, but simply to harass and drive the enemies out of the trenches 
and into fields of fire with tear gas and vomiting agents.  France actually started the use of tear 
gas grenades, but it was the Germans who first used chemical weaponry on a large scale.  In 
October 1914, the Germans fired shells at French troops filled with a gas that caused violent 
sneezing fits during the capture of Neuve Chapelle.  These attacks, while precursors to a new 
phase of the war, were militarily inconsequential.  The new phase, led by the Germans and 
chemist Fritz Haber, included new methods of gas deployment on the battlefield.  Haber utilized 
																																																						
4 Coleman, 6-7. 
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commercial gas cylinders filled with chlorine gas, a lethal, non-persistent, and powerful 
asphyxiate that caused death.  These cylinders were opened on April 22, 1915 and a favorable 
wind carried the cloud of chlorine over the Belgian town of Ypres where British, Canadian, and 
French troops begged for breath and an escape from the potent gas.  The Germans used the gas 
four more times in May before the Allies found a way to build crude versions of respirators to 
reduce the chlorine’s effectiveness.5 
The British counterattack at Loos in September 1915 showed the Allies deficiency in 
chemical knowledge.  The attack failed as the wind blew the gas back towards their own lines 
causing friendly casualties and showing the British misunderstanding of how best to use the 
weapon.  Additionally, the chemical agents were not enough to overcome the German advantage 
in the trenches.  The inability of artillery to provide supportive fire and the lack of reserve 
infantry divisions to exploit the breakthrough in enemy lines further limited the British.  The 
Germans continued to stay ahead in terms of production and development, and were the first to 
use mustard gas in artillery shells when they attacked the Russians at Riga in September 1916 
and then against the British in July 1917 at Ypres.  The troublesome characteristic about mustard 
gas was that it remained potent in the soil for weeks after its employment and froze in the soil in 
the winter where it would later thaw and have the same effects.  This means any use of the gas 
over trenches rendered those trenches unattainable until the gas dissipated, as well as proves that 
commanders had the knowledge and ability to determine which chemical agents to use at certain 
times and locations depending on their mission and avenue of approach.6 
As the lethality of chemicals improved so did the methods in which they were delivered.  
Haber’s gas cylinders depended entirely on the wind to blow the agent across the battlefield and 
																																																						
5 Coleman, xv-xvi, 12-18; Ganesan, Raza, Vijayaraghavan 166-167.	
6 Coleman, 23-25. 
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into enemy lines.  Britain’s failure at Loos proved the shortcomings of this method.  To solve 
this Britain employed four-inch Stokes mortars that fired gas cylinders to more accurately drop 
agents on the Germans.  This was the first direct violation of the 1899 Hague Convention which 
“prohibited the use of projectiles, the object of which was diffusion of asphyxiating gases,” and 
opened the gates for the expansion of chemical warfare.  The French, too, utilized gas shells 
filled with the blood agent, hydrogen cyanide during the battle of Somme in 1916.  Over the 
course of the First World War the use of chemicals developed from gas cloud attacks delivered 
by favorable winds, to gas shell attacks, to explosive shells that caused more damage by keeping 
the agent airborne longer.  These last two methods were used near the end of the war and on one 
specific occasion had an impact that would affect the future of chemical warfare.  In Wervick, 
Belgium a corporal named Adolf Hitler was burned and temporarily blinded during a British 
mustard gas attack.  His experience in this war would lead to his distaste for chemical weaponry 
and his decisions not to employ such weapons in the Second World War.  Yet, while some, like 
Hitler, were turned away from the use of chemical warfare, others began to respect its power and 
potential on the battlefield.  Still, the 100,000 deaths and 1.2 million casualties caused by 
chemical warfare in World War I led General John J. Pershing to state in his final report to 
Congress, “Whether or not gas will be employed in future wars is a matter of conjecture, but the 
effect is so deadly to the unprepared that we can never afford to neglect the question.”7 
In an attempt to regulate the use of such weapons after the war, the Allies forbade 
German production and use of gas weaponry under Article 171 of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles.  
Although this limited Germany’s ability to do research, Fritz Haber continued his work under the 
guise of studying pest control.  He, and other chemists, hoped to improve current agents so they 
																																																						
7 Coleman, xv, xxii, 26-28, 31; Ganesan, Raza, Vijayaraghavan, 167-168. 
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were cheaper and safer to produce and develop newer, more effective agents as well.  While 
these developments in future chemical warfare continued during the interwar period, so did the 
use of contemporary weapons and agents around the world.  When the Ottoman Empire broke 
down after the First World War, the League of Nations split the provinces amongst the British 
and French.  The British received the portion known as modern-day Iraq and placed an Arabian 
ruler named Faisal on the throne.  Under his rule, in June 1920, a large rebellion broke out 
against colonial rule, and the British, with full support from Winston Churchill, responded by 
using incendiary weapons and poison gas to successfully crush the revolt.  Similarly, in Morocco 
in 1921, Spain and France used poison gas to quell a Berber rebellion.  The Berbers in the Rif 
region had pushed the Spanish back north and in response the Spanish, with French aid, utilized 
poison gas to regain control of the region.8 
International conflicts such as these led to the 1925 Geneva Convention for the 
Supervision of the International Traffic in Arms and Ammunition.  This convention, whose 
objectives were both vague and easy to evade, was the first attempt to prohibit the use of 
chemical and biological weapons in war.  On June 17, 1925 thirty-eight signatories agreed to 
prohibit the use of chemical weaponry during inter-state conflicts.  The document, however, 
failed to explain if the use of chemical weapons in internal or civil conflicts was prohibited, as 
well as failing to prohibit basic research, production, or possession of chemical weapons.  
Compliance with these laws was completely voluntary, and in fact, the United States refused to 
ratify it.  The Geneva Protocol was enforced beginning February 08, 1928, but as time went on 
the word “enforced” was proven to be quite the wrong term.9   
																																																						
8 Coleman, 40, 42-45. 
9 Coleman, 45-46.	
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Ten years after signing the Geneva Protocol, Italy, in 1935, invaded Abyssinia (modern-
day Ethiopia) from their colony in Eritrea.  Ethiopia appealed to the League of Nations who in 
turn placed limited economic sanctions on Mussolini’s Italy.  As a result, Italy needed to move 
their campaign forward and take control of Ethiopia prior to the sting of the sanctions on the 
economy.  They chose to do so by dropping mustard gas bombs and spraying mustard gas from 
aircraft while also utilizing phosgene and chloropicrin in attacks whose legitimacy are still 
questioned today.  The use of these attacks varied from protecting the flanks of advancing units, 
to disrupting Ethiopian communications, to demoralizing Ethiopian troops thereby showing the 
versatility in chemical weapons usage.   Italy justified their attacks and claimed that they had not 
broken the Geneva Protocol they signed a decade earlier because Ethiopia had tortured and killed 
Italian prisoners of war.10  
The interwar period concluded with a major discovery that changed the nature of 
chemical warfare.  In 1936, Dr. Gerhard Schrader, a German scientist working at the chemical 
company IG Farben, was studying insecticides when he stumbled upon an array of poisons that 
when mixed became the first nerve gas agent.  Schrader named this colorless, odorless gas that 
entered the body through inhalation or skin penetration, tabun.  The Germans kept this agent 
secret and continued Schrader’s research.  A year later he discovered sarin gas, another nerve 
agent that was ten times as poisonous as tabun.  While phosgene and mustard gas were still the 
bulk of chemical weapons stockpiles, the discoveries of the world’s most deadly chemical agents 
foreshadowed a more gruesome style of warfare.11  
 The Japanese use of gas in their invasion of China in 1937 led the world to believe the 
battlefields of World War II would be littered with gas shells dropped during air raids.  Their use 
																																																						
10 Coleman, 45-49. 
11 Coleman, 51-52. 
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of tear-gas grenades, arsenic smoke screens, and later on mustard gas and Lewisite influenced 
countries like Great Britain and caused them to issue gas masks to the entire civilian population, 
an estimated thirty million, which included babies.  To their surprise, however, gas was not used 
in the Second World War.  Unlike the First World War, the Second was a war of rapid mobility 
epitomized by the German Blitzkrieg.  This tempo rendered the gas attacks ineffective as it 
would impact both the offense and defense as they maneuvered around the battlefield.  
Additionally, gas was no longer a new technology.  Both sides of the war had chemical 
capabilities leading to a miniature feeling of mutually assured destruction.  Hitler, whose past 
experiences already made him unwilling to use gas, recognized the retaliation that would have 
met Germany and the unprepared population had he used gas.12 
Nevertheless, both sides built factories to produce poison gas.  While Britain chose never 
to use these facilities for their intended purpose, Germany utilized their own at Dyhernfurth and 
Gendorf for nerve gas development.  Germany employed twice the scientists Britain did, and in 
May 1943 a captured German scientist revealed everything he knew about what he called Trilon 
83, better known today as tabun.  British knowledge of this nerve agent came two years prior to 
the end of the war, but they never took advantage of the information or developed their own 
tabun weapons.  This large employment of scientists led to the development of Zyklon B, a 
hydrochloric acid created by the German Pest Control Corporation, Degesh.  Zyklon B, used to 
kill vermin and fight disease in labor camps, was then tested by Karl Fritizsch and Rudolf Höss 
in gas chambers at Auschwitz.  The gas entered the membranes of the mouth, nose, esophagus, 
stomach, and lungs, and entered the bloodstream leading to a quick death.  As scholar Coleman 
stated: “Additionally, with each inhalation the person retained more of the gas and so the 
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concentration of poison in the air was reduced.  This fact simplified the ventilation problems 
afterwards.”  While Hitler did not use gas against the Allies, for fear of retaliation, he used it 
against the groups he knew did not have the capabilities to fight back.13 
Regardless of their knowledge of German research and tabun, the Allies were confident 
the Germans would not use chemical agents against them, and therefore left all anti-gas 
equipment in Britain when they invaded Normandy on June 6, 1944.  General Omar Bradley 
remarked, “When D-Day ended, without a whiff of gas, I was relieved.  For even a light 
sprinkling of persistent gas on Omaha Beach would have forced a decision in one of history’s 
climatic battles.”  Again, the use of chemical agents on the battlefield was desirable for many.  
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and US Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall 
both approved plans to utilize gas during the war, but were voted down at the last moment.  
Churchill believed that he could shorten the war by targeting 1,600 German cities or strategic 
locations to attack with phosgene and mustard gas.  British military planning staffs advised 
against that plan as the Allies would have to fight in those cities and towns as well as deal with 
the likely retaliation from the Germans.14 
Similarly, in the United States, although President Franklin Delano Roosevelt never 
planned to use poison gas except in retaliation, his military developed contingency plans for their 
possible use.  A thirty-page document code-named Operation Downfall, written by the Army 
Chemical Warfare Service in June 1945, called for the United States to attack over fifty urban 
targets in Japan.  This would take place as a two-stage operation beginning with an assault on the 
southernmost Japanese island, Kyushu, in November from which bombers could drop phosgene 
on the mainland.  This phase was called Operation Olympic and “might easily kill five million 
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people and injure many more.”  Operation Coronet would follow in March 1946 with an assault 
on Tokyo to force the Japanese surrender.  General Marshall approved this plan; however, his 
senior staff argued chemical warfare would complicate the mission in the East and would not be 
decisive enough.  Before a final decision could be reached, President Harry Truman authorized 
the dropping of the atomic bomb, thereby ending any further discussion.15 
After the war, the chemical warfare program (now named chemical defense) returned to a 
pre-war size and mentality.  This decision was made due to the lack of public support for 
chemical warfare, the lack of a need to resort to gas when other means were more effective, and 
the threat of retaliation even after the war.  Further, the post-war Potsdam Agreement stated that 
“All arms, ammunition and implements of war [belonging to the Germans] shall be held at the 
disposal of the Allies or destroyed.”  The majority of chemical stockpiles from both sides were 
dumped into the Baltic Sea, Bay of Biscay, and off the coasts of Scotland, Ireland, and Japan.  
Demilitarization efforts included the control of German research and notes regarding the 
development of chemical agents.  These efforts failed in some parts of Germany as the Soviet 
Union was able to capture the tabun-producing factory in Dyhernfurth and the almost completed 
sarin-producing factory at Falkenhagen.  In the Soviets exploration of these facilities they 
learned about soman, the German’s most secret and poisonous nerve agent.  Soman is a colorless 
liquid with a slightly fruity odor that causes a runny nose, salivation, nausea, involuntary 
urination and defecation, convulsions, and respiratory failure.  It is twice as toxic as tabun.  
While the British and United States were still trying to understand the agents’ effects on the 
nervous system, the Soviets had factories and plants that would be fully serviceable within 
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months.  This knowledge sparked an arms development race and kicked off the forty-four year 
Cold War.16 
The United States quickly built a huge arsenal of chemical weapons including a new 
nerve agent discovered by Dr. Ranajit Ghosh in 1952.  Ghosh had been working with pesticides 
in Britain at the time, but with the post-war government’s inability to fund more research, Ghosh 
turned to the United States with his knowledge in 1953.  This agent was far more toxic and 
persistent than tabun or sarin, caused the same effects of all nerve agents, and ended in a loss of 
consciousness, coma, and death.  It was venomous in nature and therefore the United States 
called their weaponized version of the agent VX, a drop of which could kill the enemy.  A 
cocktail of drugs called Atropine served as an antidote, but was limited and often did not reach 
victims quickly enough.17 
After World War II, the United States began to take over the use of chemical weaponry in 
their efforts to police third-world countries like Vietnam.  The effective method of gas bombing 
in urban environments did not translate well to the jungles.  Therefore, in 1961, President 
Kennedy initiated Project Ranch Hand and authorized the Department of Defense to begin trials 
on anti-plant agents in South Vietnam.  The ability to drop chemicals from aircraft and have 
them clear the ground of vegetation as well as the enemy proved a very attractive military course 
of action.  These anti-plant agents, given color code names based on the painted stripe around 
each fifty-five gallon drum it came in (i.e. the infamous Agent Orange), were used extensively 
from 1961-67, but began to decline as the United States’ stockpiles were running low, as public 
concern for the Vietnamese farmers increased, as the scientific community began to worry about 
lasting effects on the nation’s ecology, and as the international community cracked down on the 
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laws of war.  Outside nations did not see the line the United States drew between defoliants like 
Agent Orange and chemical weapons designed specifically to kill people.  In an April 1969 
attempt to better clarify the United States’ chemical warfare policy the Secretary of Defense 
Melvin Laird explained: 
It is the policy of the United States to develop and maintain a defensive 
chemical and biological capability so that United States military forces can 
operate for some period of time in a toxic environment if necessary; to develop 
and maintain a limited offensive capability in order to deter all use of chemical… 
weapons by the threat of retaliation in kind; and to continue a program of research 
and development in this area to minimize the possibility of technological 
surprise.18   
Secretary Laird’s words eloquently and effectively explain the defensive policy of 
the United States in reference to chemical warfare. 
The United States’ use of anti-plant agents, napalm, and white phosphorous, considered 
legitimate munitions by the United States killed many during the Vietnam War, but the death of 
one Australian Corporal named Robert Bowtell opened the floodgates for chemical weaponry 
opposition.   The New York Times printed Bowtell’s story and explained how he had been 
fighting Vietcong Guerrillas in the tunnels northwest of Saigon when he was exposed to some 
type of asphyxiating gas.  Although he was wearing a gas mask, Bowtell was killed and the 
story’s exposure led to a call for action.  The United Nations responded with a 1969 Resolution 
to the Geneva Protocol which demanded strict compliance from all states with the principles of 
the original protocol.  This feeble attempt to regulate chemical weapons failed once again, and 
																																																						
18 Coleman, 90-95, 104. 
	 25 
even though the United States came very close to ratifying the protocol, they chose not to in the 
end.19 
The United Nations continued its efforts and openly condemned the production and 
stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction throughout the Cold War.  The United States came 
under intense pressure when Congress revealed it had been secretly testing nerve agents at 
Edgewood Arsenal and Fort McClellan.  President Nixon stepped in to dissolve the potential 
conflict and reaffirmed his non-first-use policy as well as resubmitted the 1925 Geneva Protocol 
to the Senate for ratification.  The Senate finally ratified the Protocol in 1974 and President 
Gerald Ford signed it in January of the following year, thereby ending chemical agent 
production, at least until 1979.  By that year the Soviet Union was found to have chemical arms 
and defense capabilities equivalent to that of the United States, prompting the United States to 
reboot their chemical program and stay ahead of their Cold War foe.  The use of Soviet- 
developed chemical weapons in Laos in 1975, Vietnam in 1978, and Afghanistan in 1979 were 
all ignored because while the Soviet Union had signed the Geneva Protocol in 1928, the other 
three states had not, and retaliation against non-signatories was not prohibited.  These and further 
actions in Egypt, Yemen, and Syria fueled a chemical weapons exploration in the Middle East 
that culminated in the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s.20 
The Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s is a horrifying, modern example of the use of chemical 
weaponry in war.  Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s long-term goal of Arab unity and regional 
dominance led to an Arabization campaign that targeted minorities within Iraq’s borders.  The 
campaign against the Kurds in northern Iraq was called the al-Anfal campaign and involved the 
massacre of 150,000 to 200,000 individuals.  The most devastating attack of this campaign 
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occurred on March 16, 1988 as Saddam bombed five thousand citizens in the Kurdish village of 
Halabja through the use of mustard gas and nerve agents.  These events raised a few questions.  
What caused this type of retaliation from Saddam?  Why would Saddam bomb his own land and 
murder his own citizens?  What role did Iran play in this part of the war?21 
The war was eight-years old at the time of the Halabja massacre, but the history between 
Iraq, Iran, and the Kurds goes back much further.  The Iran-Iraq war began as the two nations 
competed for regional dominance and a role as the Arab world power.  The Iraq Saddam Hussein 
was born into was fractured and created from a British colonial failure.  The Allied victory over 
the Ottoman Empire in World War I left the region open for British colonialism, however, 
excessive debt from the war and a series of revolts against the Westerners forced Britain to 
change its plans.  The result was an unfinished Hashemite Kingdom of Iraq with three very 
different regions divided by language, ethnic origins, and religion.  The Southern province 
contained Shi’a tribes, the Kurds resided in the oil-rich Northern province, and the Sunnis lived 
in the central portion of Iraq and gained relative control by default due to their geographic 
position.  This design forced the three groups to come together and collectively call themselves 
Iraqis.  Iraq’s first monarch, Faisal, was installed by the British and remarked in 1933, “There is 
still – and I say this with a heart full of sorrow – no Iraqi people, but unimaginable masses of 
human beings, devoid of any patriotic idea, imbued with religious traditions and absurdities, 
connected by no common tie, giving ear to evil, prone to anarchy, and perpetually ready to rise 
against any government whatever.”22 
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Coups and counter-coups characterized the next twenty-five years as Iraqi autonomy was 
repressed under limited British imperialism.  In 1958 the monarchy was overthrown and an Iraqi 
Republic remained for the next decade.  Turmoil continued during the Republic and resulted in a 
competition for power in Bagdad as three contenders fought for control of Iraq.  These 
contenders included the Iraqi military, the Communist party, and the emerging Ba’ath Party. 23  
The Ba’ath Party had launched an unsuccessful coup in 1963, but later succeeded in placing 
General Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr in power five years later.  The Ba’ath Party believed in “one 
Arab nation with an immortal mission” and had the goal of putting Iraq back in its rightful place 
as a dominant nation in the world.  Saddam Hussein grew up as a young leader in this party and 
was indoctrinated in its beliefs.  Those beliefs often aligned with those taught to him by his uncle 
Khayrallah Talfah who had written the work Three Whom God Should Not Have Created: 
Persians, Jews, and Flies and helped develop Saddam’s worldview and hunger for Arab 
dominance.24 
By 1975, Saddam had risen through the ranks and was “vice president of Iraq’s 
revolutionary command council (RCC) – in effect, the country’s number-two man behind his 
relative and president, Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr.  Saddam was arguably more powerful than the 
president due to his control of the intelligence services.”  In this role, Saddam negotiated with 
Iran over the Shatt al-Arab waterway, fought against the Kurds’ campaign for autonomy, and 
unhappily watched the signing of the Algiers Agreement.25  Iraqi pride and power were 
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decimated following these events and by July 1979 President al-Bakr resigned.  Saddam 
immediately took over as Iraq’s president, secretary general of the Ba’ath Party’s regional 
command, chairman of the RCC, and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.  His execution of 
twenty-two of the Ba’ath Party’s most senior members cemented his authority and ensured the 
loyalty of his government.  As professor Williamson Murray and historian Kevin Woods state, 
“In terms of its power, Saddam believed his new state, resting on Arab nationalism and oil, 
would easily equal China and perhaps even the United States.”  Saddam believed his Iraq was on 
the rise and searched for a way to show it.  His hatred for the Jewish state of Israel was met with 
a respect for their capabilities, so he turned to a closer and more attractive enemy.26 
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2 
 THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND RELATIONS: 1980-1987 
 
Iran and Iraq had a series of historical problems that included competition for regional 
dominance, chronic territorial disputes, support for different populations, and the fact that Iran 
embraced Shi’a Islam in the sixteenth century, a decision strongly opposed by Iraq’s Sunni elite.  
If Saddam could invade Iran and earn a quick victory, he believed he would be immortalized as a 
great Arab leader and regain the Shatt territory as well as some of the pride and Arabization 
momentum lost over the past five years.  The overthrow of the Shah by Ayatollah Khomeini and 
the subsequent Iranian Revolution only added to his confidence.  Iran lost support from the 
United States and therefore the military equipment previously supplied by them.  A lack of 
replacements for broken parts coupled with the weakened military caused by Khomeini as he 
executed pro-Shah leaders and began a loyalist military, designated the Islamic Revolutionary 
Guards, made Iran appear vulnerable.  Saddam’s knowledge of this potential vulnerability; Iraq’s 
stockpile of Soviet weaponry acquired through the 1972 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation;27 
and the Iraqi alliance with the Gulf States of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan encouraged 
Saddam’s outlook on his military ambitions.  In March 1980, Iran withdrew diplomats from 
Baghdad, and in April 1980 border clashes intensified.  Over forty-five years of history between 
the two states met along the Shatt al-Arab and set the stage for the Iran-Iraq War.28 
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On September 14, 1980 Iran announced that it would no longer follow the Algiers 
Agreement and Iraq responded three days later also denouncing the Agreement on the terms that 
Iran consistently violated the accords anyway.  The breaking of this agreement, coupled with the 
increased air activity along the border and a May 1980 report claiming that Iran entered Iraq 
thirty-seven times in forty-five days to resupply the Kurds in the north and reconnoiter the south 
led Saddam to the battlefield.  His declaration that, ““This shatt shall again be, as it has been 
throughout history, Iraqi and Arab in name and reality,” led directly into Iraq’s entrance into Iran 
on September 22, 1980.  Notes from an Iraqi government meeting held six days earlier show that 
“neither he [Saddam] nor his advisors had a clear idea of what military operations would entail,” 
but Saddam initiated the war regardless.  At the time Iran’s geopolitical position was superior to 
Iraq in every way.  Iraq had a population three times smaller than Iran’s (thirteen million 
compared to thirty-nine million); Iraq’s oil was located close to its border with Iran; Iraq was 
landlocked and Iran controlled its only passage to the sea, the Shatt al-Arab; and Iraq’s ethnic 
and religious divisions were deeper than Iran’s.  Although Saddam knew these facts he refused to 
believe that his vision of an Arab world with Iraq at its center would ever be denied.  This 
mentality drove him to continue the war even when his plan for a quick victory failed and Iran’s 
superior resources began to show.29 
The war started off with an Iraqi offensive that kept the Iranians in a defensive posture 
until the Iraqi military was stretched too thin to continue advancing.  Iran’s counter-offensives, 
characterized by human-wave assaults, began in 1982 and turned the war into one of attrition.  
Would Iran run out of men willing to die or would Iraq run out of bullets first?  Iran’s population 
superiority forced Iraq to gather every military-aged man, placed extreme pressure on these new 
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ground forces, and depleted the Iraqi treasury as Saddam tried to neutralize the human waves 
through artillery strikes.  His response to Iran’s manpower advantage was threefold: he planned 
to use inexpensive chemical weapons to increase Iranian casualties and combat their population 
advantage, wage war on Iran’s civilian population and cities to reduce morale and support for the 
war, and cut off Iranian oil exports.  The decision to use chemical weapons opened a door that 
was not shut for the remainder of the war.30 
The global stage in which the Iran-Iraq War took place is difficult to characterize.  
International relations swayed from clear understandings to blurred chaos, spending considerable 
more time in the latter, as alliances and economics influenced the political decisions of nations 
and their relationship with the belligerents.  Events that occurred at the onset of the war became 
the precedent and existed as trends for the next eight years.  The administration of a non-binding 
United Nations Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire, followed by Iraq’s willingness 
to negotiate an end to the war, answered by Iran’s immediate and unwavering rejection stands 
out as the most consistent trend.  This chapter strives to expand upon that trend to show why the 
lack of an effective and aggressive international response to the war, specifically the use of 
chemical weapons, led to the conflict’s continuation and descent into a total war that eventually 
brought nerve gas to the lungs of civilians in the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan. 
Paramount to an understanding of international relations during the war is a knowledge of 
the region’s historical alliances and ties with global powers prior to the 1980s.  During the 
Vietnam War the United States and Great Britain relied on the Shah of Iran to balance the 
Middle East and keep the Soviet influence at bay.  In doing so, the United States provided Iran 
with eight Tomcat interceptors armed with Phoenix missiles with the capability of destroying a 
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target more than ninety miles away.  Iranian military students trained in the United States and the 
two nations maintained a civil nuclear cooperation program.  Meanwhile, Saddam Hussein and 
Iraqi president al-Bakr reconciled the nation’s relationship with the Soviet Union through the 
1972 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation as they recognized the Iraqi Communist Party in 
return for Soviet weaponry.  Iraq also turned to the French who provided them with weapons 
(armored vehicles, mortars and shells, missiles, helicopters, anti-aircraft radar systems, etc.), 
civil nuclear power assistance in the form of the Franco-Iraqi Cooperation Agreement of 
November 1985, Scud missiles (as did the USSR), and cooperation in the oil sector.  With 
French help, Saddam was able to build two offshore oil terminals at Mina al-Bakr and Khor al-
Amaya allowing them to rival Iran in the oil industry.  Baghdad’s argument that Iraq was the 
Arab’s natural shield from Iranian imperialism further increased the nation’s standing as it 
gained the valuable support of the Gulf States.31 
It is worth noting the United States at this time supported Iran, a position very different 
than the one in which the nation would find itself ten years later.  Iraq had broken diplomatic ties 
with the United States after June 1967 when the United States backed Israel in the Six Day War 
and a second time when the American ally was attacked by Iraq and other Arab states in 1973.  
The state of Israel wedged Iraq and the United States apart while Cold War logic aligned Iran 
with the United States leading historians to believe that the United States did not want Iraq to 
attack Iran.  Baghdad and Moscow had just signed the 1972 treaty meaning the Iraqi army would 
have used Soviet weaponry, a decision the United States would not want to see because it would 
offer the Soviets a global stage to demonstrate the power of their weaponry without the United 
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States being able or willing to counter in a competition for superiority.  The United States could 
not back Iraq if this fight took place because of their alliance with Israel, and the weapons 
contracts and flow of oil connecting Iran to the United States offered a much more attractive side 
with which to ally.32 
Then in 1979, the Islamic Revolution, ousting of the Shah, and institution of Ayatollah 
Khomeini led to an anti-Western Iran that cancelled the arms contracts and cost the United States 
ten billion dollars in revenue.  The resulting trade embargo preventing the sale of spare parts to 
the Iranian army, the decision to provide American medical treatment to the exiled Shah, and the 
secret meeting between Iranian Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan and United States National 
Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski in October of 1979 soured relations between the two 
countries.  The November 4 hostage crisis at the American embassy in Tehran illustrated the 
complete breakdown between the two nations.  Still, the United States and President Jimmy 
Carter did not favor war against Iran.  War would have caused a slower liberation of the 
hostages, a steep increase in oil prices, and the Soviet intervention in Iran in order to help Iraq.  
Pierre Razoux, historian and author of The Iran-Iraq War, writes, “In the American elite’s eyes, 
the natural partner of the United States clearly had to remain Iran; Iraq could only serve as a 
foil.”33 
Yet, President Carter chose neither war nor appeasement, but rather indifference, as he 
decided not to warn Iran of Iraqi preparations for war.  When Ronald Reagan took office in 1981 
the Iranians released the fifty-two hostages, reopened relations with Washington D.C. and 
received eight billion dollars in now unfrozen assets and an arms deal worth $480 million.  This 
deal for spare tank and aircraft parts slid around the trade embargo because South Korea, Greece, 
																																																						
32 Razoux, 69-73. 
33 Razoux, 69-73, 78-79. 
	 34 
Turkey, and Taiwan delivered their own equipment to Iran and were later reimbursed financially 
by the United States.  To be certain, despite these deals the United States were not allies with the 
Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran.  The Reagan government simply utilized economic and military 
resources to secure the safe return of American citizens.34 
A very similar series of events occurred on the other side of the war between Iraq and the 
USSR.  The Soviet Union was not pleased their ally chose to attack Iran without first consulting 
them.  The Kremlin believed Saddam was too arrogant and had started a war that would draw the 
United States back into the region.  Still, the USSR chose to preserve diplomatic relations with 
their Middle Eastern ally and keep military advisors in Baghdad.  In display of their displeasure 
the USSR cut all weapons deliveries to Iraq and stop all contracts currently under negotiation.  
The Kremlin even reached out to Iran to offer Soviet support, an offer that Ayatollah Khomeini 
declined at the time, but would later accept discreetly.  The two nations traded, sending spare 
parts and weapons to Iran in return for a US-made Tomcat for the Soviets to study.  Meanwhile, 
the Soviets continued to secretly supply Iraq through other Socialist countries like Romania, 
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.  Even China backed Baghdad and provided arms for the 
Iraqi army in order to compete with the USSR, conquer new markets, and maintain balance.35 
A myriad of European nations entered into the war on one side or the other, sometimes 
both, often looking for the best contracts.  France supported Iraq as mentioned above, but also 
provided Iran with rail, automobile, audiovisual, and nuclear equipment until Ayatollah 
Khomeini took power and denounced the nuclear agreement with Paris.  The British continued to 
support contracts signed before the war.  Germany remained “neutral” but sold weaponry to their 
biggest regional trading partner, Iran, behind closed doors, while also selling Mercedes cars, 
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machine tools, chemicals for weapons of mass destruction, tank recovery vehicles and more to 
Iraq.  Italy too tried to play both sides as they honored old contracts, while Spain and Greece 
shipped spare parts for US designed F-4 Phantom jets to Iran, and weapons, antitank guns, and 
Land Rovers to Iraq.  Historian Razoux explained, “Overall, European countries delivered 
twenty-seven billion dollars’ worth of military equipment to Iraq and Iran, making up a quarter 
of their weapon purchases.”  Latin American and Asian countries also joined in on the economic 
opportunities the war offered, albeit to a lesser degree.36 
In terms of regional alliances, it is sufficient to show which side the nations chose to 
support and categorize them accordingly.  Razoux observed,  
Arab leaders took positions based on their own interests, the nature of their bilateral 
relations with Baghdad and Tehran, but especially their rivalries – for several of 
them harbored ambitions to impose their leadership on the Arab-speaking world.  
Yet all agreed on one thing: everything had to be done to avoid letting the conflict 
develop into a regionwide war that could potentially degenerate into a military 
conflict between the Americans and the Soviets, with the Arabs left to bear the 
devastating consequences.37  
Jordan, Morocco, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Egypt all 
supported Iraq for reasons ranging from the guarantees of cheap oil and safety (Jordan), to 
support for Baghdad because their rival supported Tehran (Morocco and Algeria respectfully), to 
hatred for Iran (Egypt) and the use of Iraq as a natural barrier to Iranian Shiite influence (Saudi 
Arabia).  Contrarily, Algeria, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, South Yemen, and Israel supported Iran in 
one way or another.  Their reasons too ranged from direct hatred of the enemy (Libya, Syria, 
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Israel) to distaste for the enemy’s allies (South Yemen, Algeria).  Only Oman and Bahrain 
managed to remain neutral mediators as they both requested the presence of Western military 
forces in the region.38 
 With these alliances in place Iraq and Iran began a pre-war dance of bombings and border 
disputes in late August 1980.  Iran’s choice to deny foreign journalists access to conflict zones 
caused the international community to distrust Iran, while Saddam encouraged journalists to see 
the villages of Khanaqin and Mandali after Iran bombed them on September 4, 1980.  Saddam 
denounced the Algiers Agreement two weeks later and Ayatollah Khomeini responded with a 
refusal to negotiate and a call to war.  The United Nations Security Council, still locked in their 
fragile alliances and hardened Cold War mentalities, could not reach an agreement and simply 
watched the war begin.  Days after the start of the war, Saddam recognized his progress was not 
promising.  He decided a ceasefire and negotiation rather than an offensive may be the best 
course of action saying, “Iraq is prepared to negotiate directly with the Iranian party, or through a 
third party or any international organization, for a just and honorable solution that guarantees our 
rights.”  Iraq’s terms were the renouncement of the Algiers Agreement by the Supreme Leader, 
recognition of Iraqi sovereignty over the entire Shatt al-Arab, and the Iraqi control of the lands 
around Qasr-e-Shirin, Sumer, and Mehran that the Iraqi army had already conquered.  Saddam 
issued a unilateral truce in the first week of October in an attempt to convince Tehran to accept 
his offer.  Iran simply responded with the demands they never gave up on for the next eight 
years: the stepping down of Saddam Hussein, the admission that Iraq was the aggressor, 
compensation for war damages with control of Basra until the debt was paid, and a referendum 
in Iraqi Kurdistan to allow the Kurds to choose between autonomy and integration into Iran.  
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Again, in October 1980 Saddam offered to hold negotiations with Tehran.  His initial offensive 
had stalled at Khorramshahr and the beginning of winter ended his campaign.  Iran, again 
responded with their list of conditions, unacceptable in Saddam’s eyes.  The end of 1980 
convinced Saddam that he needed to “coerce Iran into negotiating by bombing its population and 
oil infrastructure.”39 
 Iraq’s transition of the offensive to Iraqi Kurdistan characterized the first half of 1981, 
quickly followed by a summer full of important changes.  The Israelis destroyed the Osirak 
nuclear power plant in early June 1981 with direct hits to the plant’s main reactor, contamination 
dome, and underground research lab.  The damage cost Saddam billions of dollars and the ability 
to force Iran to surrender under nuclear threat.  Saddam also could no longer retaliate against 
Israel without opening a second front.  His place as the Arab world’s leader, a position he 
believed had to be held by a nation with nuclear capabilities, was also called into question.  
Iraq’s loss of nuclear power was also a critical turning point for the international community.  
France and the Soviet Union no longer backed Iraq’s nuclear program, but the United States, 
USSR, and European nations entered into closer relations with Iraq now that their nuclear 
supremacy was not challenged.40 
 Meanwhile in Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini removed President Bani-Sadr on June 11, 1981 
and two months later two mullahs named Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Ali Khamenei stepped 
on to the political scene as speaker of Parliament and President respectfully.  Together with 
Prime Minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi they established a new military doctrine revolving around 
three core principles: a requirement to follow all orders given by the Supreme Leader to the 
letter, the desire to cut all dependency on foreign nations for equipment and thus become self-
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sufficient, and the need to simplify military operations and lower the cost of war through the use 
of cheap, excess weaponry.  The only excess weaponry Iran possessed were troops, and on 
March 17, 1982 Operation Fatimah proved that human wave assaults could be effective against 
Iraqi defenses, a strategy the Iranians would continue to use throughout the war.  These human 
wave attacks were often made up of soldiers of all ages.  In the spring of 1982 the Pasdaran41 
boasted a 150,000-man militia however, only a third of these soldiers were actually of draft age.  
The Ministry of Education prioritized preparing children for war instead of teaching the 
curriculum.  These child soldiers were not even given weapons.  They were handed grenades and 
were not issued identification tags because they often did not survive long enough to make it 
worth the cost.  Two years later at the Majnoon Islands, 57 percent of the Iranian force were 
children, and by the war’s end in 1988 close to 80,000 children had been killed.42 
 In late April 1982, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC)43 called for a 
resolution between the two belligerents.  The proposal was based on an Iraqi withdrawal from 
the territory occupied since September 1980, the establishment of a buffer force provided by OIC 
member states, the development of an international committee sent to make a ruling regarding 
the Shatt al-Arab, and the creation of a commission designed to assess the damages done to Iran 
thus far.  The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)44 even offered to prepare a compensation fund 
for Iran, yet Ayatollah Khomeini remained immovable.  He rejected the mediation and 
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demanded Saddam Hussein step down, Iraq recognize their responsibility for starting the war, 
and the repatriation of Shiites expelled in 1980.  Saddam, in turn, denied the demands.45 
 Other international peace initiatives also failed miserably.  Five days after the hostilities 
began, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 479 asking the 
belligerents to not turn to force, and inviting the international community to prevent the 
conflict’s expansion.  Saddam proclaimed his willingness to put an end to the war if Iran gave up 
the Shatt al-Arab and respected internationally-recognized borders, but Iran proved unwilling.  
Other nonaligned states like India, Cuba, and Pakistan tried mediation as well; all returned 
empty-handed.  But now that Iran had taken the initiative the United States was prepared to 
further support Middle Eastern nations fighting Iranian and Islamic expansionism.  Washington 
desired to remain neutral, but realized Iraq may be the weaker regime and might need assistance 
in order to stop the Iranian attacks and westward movement.  President Ronald Reagan 
authorized the CIA to secretly provide military equipment to Iraq as long as it was not American-
made.  This directive took the form of large amounts of Soviet-made weapons and ammunition 
sent to Iraq via the gray market.  Further, President Reagan sent CIA veteran Tom Twetten to 
Baghdad to provide them with satellite imagery of the front lines near the border, and convinced 
Congress to take Iraq off the list of states supporting terrorism, a decision that historian Razoux 
explained, “made it possible to reestablish bilateral commercial ties, bank loans, and American 
investments in Iraq.  It also paved the way for a potential resumption of diplomatic relations.”46 
 In June 1982, Saddam was gifted with another opportunity to end the war honorably.  
The Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) hiding in Lebanon was believed to be responsible 
for an attack on the Israeli ambassador in London.  Israel retaliated by crossing the border into 
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South Lebanon in order to find the assassin, an invasion Iraq did not appreciate.  On June 10, 
Saddam unilaterally entered a ceasefire and accepted the requests from Iran to include the 
withdrawal from conquered territories, payment of war reparations, recognition of the border as 
defined by the Algiers Agreement of 1975, acceptance of responsibility for the war, and he even 
offered Iranian troops access to cross Iraqi territory while on their way to defend their ally, 
Lebanon, against Israel.  Saddam did not, however, step down or repatriate the Shiite population 
expelled from Iraq prior to the war.  King Fahd of Saudi Arabia approved of this proclamation 
and offered to pay $50 billion to Iran for war damages, but the Iranians were not impressed.  
They demanded $150 billion and pushed the Saudis into a now obvious alliance with Iraq.  The 
Saudis even reached out to the United States and acted as an intermediary as the United States 
sent precision-guided munitions to Iraq in order to increase their bombing accuracy.  This was 
the first time in the war that US-made equipment was sent to one of the belligerents.  Rafsanjani 
and Ayatollah Khomeini staunchly opposed Saddam’s attempt at peace and chose to continue the 
war on June 22.  Three weeks later the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 514 
to again put an end to the war, and again failed to do so.  Despite Baghdad’s willingness to 
cooperate, Tehran chose the path of war.47 
 The month of October 1982 began with the Muslim Ibn Aqil offensive near Qasr-e-Shirin 
and Sumer in the central region of Iraq.  The Iranian objective was to breach Iraqi lines and 
advance towards Baghdad.  Throughout this campaign waves of Iranian soldiers rushed across 
the border towards the nearby Iraqi towns but were slowed by incapacitating CS gas.  The 
Iranian offensive ended shortly after it begun with nothing to show except for the empty beds of 
the 6,000 who now laid on the battlefield.  The United Nations Security Council again issued a 
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Resolution (522) proposing that impartial observers be deployed to oversee a ceasefire.  Per 
usual, Iraq accepted the resolution while Iran outright denied their cooperation.  Historian 
Razoux explained the UN Security Council based the resolution on “Chapter 6 of the UN 
Charter, rather than Chapter 7—which would have allowed the recourse to force – the rejection 
had no effect beyond exacerbating the international community’s disapproval.”  The year came 
to a close with an escalation to total war as both belligerents began to bomb civilian populations 
in their enemy’s major cities.48 
Iranian Offensives from July to November 198249 
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 The new year opened with an uncharacteristic insinuation from the government in 
Tehran.  A published map detailing the front lines showed areas of territory held by Iraqi forces.  
The document implied that Iran would be willing to negotiate if Iraq evacuated and recognized 
Iranian control over those areas.  Saddam denied this proposition as several of these territories 
were on Iraqi soil prior to the start of the war however, he offered to travel to Tehran to 
personally discuss a ceasefire with Ayatollah Khomeini.  The Supreme Leader was tempted to 
speak with Saddam, but Rafsanjani convinced him this decision to compromise would not punish 
the Iraqi dictator, one of the ultimate goals of the war.  Saddam continued his efforts to bring 
Iran to the negotiating table by calling on the UN, OIC, and the Non-Aligned Movement to 
pressure Iran to accept the ceasefire in February 1983.  On May 25, Deputy Prime Minister Tariq 
Aziz offered to negotiate an agreement with Iran to stop bombing civilian populations under the 
guidance of the UN.  Iran rejected the offer.  On June 7, Saddam requested a one-month truce at 
the start of Ramadan and was again turned down.  The Dawn III Iranian offensive in late summer 
1983 resulted in another UN Security Council resolution (540) that demanded an immediate end 
to hostilities and bombings of civilians.  Once again, Iraq accepted while Iran rejected.50 
 The consistent refusals and lack of cooperation from Tehran pushed Saddam to continue 
a war he was prepared to end.  The Dawn IV offensive begun in the fall in Iraqi Kurdistan forced 
Saddam to deliver more troops to the north to protect Sulaymaniah and key oil fields and retake 
Penjwin from the Iranians.  In addition, Saddam delivered mortar shells containing mustard gas 
to the Kurdish front where they were deployed against Iranian Pasdaran divisions, pushing them 
back to their entrenchments at Penjwin.  This marked the first time chemical weapons were used 
in the war and showed that, for Saddam, Iraqi Kurdistan was a line that Iran was not to cross.  
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Dawn IV ended in November and both sides waited for the spring of 1984 to continue major 
operations.51 
 On February 22, 1984 Iran launched Operation Kheibar with the goal of seizing the oil 
fields on the Majnoon Islands and then cut off the road connecting Baghdad and Basra.  By 
February 29 both sides sent all reserves to the islands.  Iraqi General Adnan Khairallah inspected 
the front and decided he needed the Republican Guard, chemical weapons, and a high tension 
line through the Tigris River and into the marshes around the islands used to electrocute Iranian 
soldiers wading through the water.  PC-7 Turbo Trainer planes given by Switzerland flew over 
the Iranian forces and sprayed soldiers with tabun nerve gas while Iraqi artillery simultaneously 
shelled the enemy with mustard gas.  Thousands more were killed by the electric current flowing 
through the surrounding waters.  Within ten days the Iraqis were able to recapture most of the 
territory they lost with the help of these weapons along with phosphorous shells that horrifically 
burned Iranian soldiers.  This offensive resulted in the deaths of 20,000 Iranians and 3,000 Iraqis, 
followed by 30,000 wounded Iranians compared to 9,000 wounded Iraqis.  The Supreme Defense 
Council in Tehran chose not to follow Rafsanjani’s plan to continue human wave offensives, but 
rather settled on a policy of small-scale trench warfare.  Saddam continued to lay low and not 
retaliate in hopes that the international community would see Iran as the aggressor and Iraq as 
the new victim.52 
 Events occurring around the region in the 1980s continued to affect the war and its fragile 
alliance system.  The October 23, 1983 attack on US Marine headquarters in Lebanon killed 242 
Americans.  Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah Shiites claimed the attack.  On December 12, the 
Kuwait embassy was also bombed by Kuwaiti Shiites backed by Iran.  In response, the United 
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States launched Operation Staunch which threatened American allies economically if they chose 
to supply Iran with any weapons or ammunition.  After the capture and torture of William 
Buckley, CIA station chief in Beirut in March 1984, the United States strengthened relations 
with Iraq, pledged to reopen embassies that year, and offered to finance the war.  Still the United 
States was not willing to supply Iraq with weapons.  In November of the same year, President 
Reagan announced National Security Decision Directive 114 which began plans to protect 
American interests in the Gulf and to save Iraq by any legal means to include the restoration of 
diplomatic relations between Baghdad and Washington if necessary.  The United States provided 
Iraq with satellite imagery and data received by its Airborne Warning and Control System 
(AWACS) and electronic surveillance planes patrolling the Gulf region.  In turn, Iran began a 
series of kidnappings of civilians and government officials from countries supporting Iraq in 
some way, to include the United States, France, and Britain.  As a result, only four nations were 
willing to support Iran openly: Syria, Libya, China, and North Korea.  These four only met one 
third of Iran’s war needs, but Tehran managed to use threats and payoffs to secure the remaining 
support from twenty-five other nations.  On the other hand, Iraq held weapons contracts with 
thirty countries led by the Soviet Union, France and China which covered 85 percent of Iraq’s 
needs.  Ireland was the only nation in Europe able to keep its hands completely clean as every 
other country found a way to sell military equipment to one of the two belligerents.53 
 It is critical to note that some of Iraq’s contracts included the sale of chemical weapons 
and materials.  The Soviet Union provided an improved version of World War I mustard gas, 
Spain sold Baghdad containers meant for spreading chemical products, and Egypt sent large 
amounts of empty artillery shells that could be filled with gas.  Germany, Belgium, Denmark, the 
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Netherlands, and Lebanon all provided chemical substances to Baghdad, although perhaps 
without knowing that Iraq’s chemical weapon program had taken off in terms of the development 
of neurotoxic agents.  Large stockpiles were created, conditions for the use of chemicals in 
military operations were laid out, and “life-size” experiments were even conducted in which the 
effectiveness of tabun was tried on an Iraqi battalion.  The results were as expected.54  
 Iran jumped at the opportunity to destroy Iraq’s international image by citing their use of 
chemical weapons as a violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.  Iraq replied with an accusation 
of Iranian mistreatment of prisoners of war.  The International Committee of the Red Cross ruled 
that Iraqi prisoners were being tortured and held in rotting prison camps without making a 
decision on the use of chemical weapons.  Iran continued the fight and went to the UN Security 
Council by sending gas victims to European hospitals.  A delegation of experts was sent to Iran 
and confirmed that Baghdad was using chemical weapons and poison gas.  Iraq denied the 
evidence at first but eventually admitted to the use of these weapons, claiming their right to use 
anything to defend their own territory.  They also promised they would only use the gas on the 
battlefield and not against civilians.  The UN Security Council tried to pass a resolution in March 
1984 that would declare Iraq’s usage as wrong, but the United States and Soviet Union vetoed it.  
Washington wanted to show Iraq their support, and Moscow did not want to set a precedent 
against the usage of chemical weapons as they were using them in Afghanistan at the same time.  
Again a United Nations resolution failed to make an impact on the war.  Still, Iran chose not to 
participate in the manufacture and employment of chemical weapons as its leaders believed it 
went against Koranic principles, would further isolate them, and would give Iraq an excuse to 
launch their stockpiles on Iranian soldiers.55 
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Trends continued into 1985 as Iran’s Badr offensive resulted in a successful assault that 
was in turn beaten back by Iraqi counterattacks supplemented by chemical weapons.  In April, 
Saddam called for another ceasefire after a second war of the cities killed hundreds of civilians.  
Again, Saddam requested an end of civilian bombings, a withdrawal of both armies to the border, 
an exchange of all prisoners of war, and negotiations for war reparations.  Significantly, Iraq did 
not mention the Shatt al-Arab potentially implying that Baghdad was willing to surrender their 
claim on the waterway in order to end the war.  Iran, however, required the removal of Saddam 
from leadership and the repatriation of Iraqi Shiite refugees in Iran.  As a result, both sides 
continued bombings until a June 15 truce was confirmed under the oversight of UN Secretary 
General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, and an end to civilian bombings was reached.  Nevertheless, 
Iran continued its ground war, albeit with little success, through Operations Jerusalem 1 through 
Jerusalem 6 and Operation Fath.56 
 Iran’s early winter campaigns began again in February 1986 with the Dawn 8 offensive.  
The target was the al-Faw peninsula in the south of Iraq with the goal of blocking Iraqi access to 
the Gulf and its oil resources, as well as open a path to Basra.  Because of the importance of 
these objectives Saddam authorized the use of chemical weapons again.  Iraq utilized mustard 
and sarin gas in a February 12 attack that resulted in 8,500 casualties.  The Fatma e-Zahra 
hospital treating wounded soldiers and civilians was bombed repeatedly and caused the casualty 
toll to rise to nearly twelve thousand.  Despite these losses, the Iranian soldiers were not 
prevented from taking the peninsula in four days.  Four days later the Iraqi counterattack 
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     Iranian Badr Offensive (March 11-22, 1985)57 
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regained twelve miles of territory on the peninsula with the help of continued chemical and 
traditional artillery shelling.  The use of these weapons was confirmed by United States Defense 
Intelligence Agency analyst Rick Francona who was working as the as the Iraqi Military 
Intelligence liaison.  Francona traveled to the combat zone where he “personally picked up used 
atropine injectors off the battlefield and from captured Iranian vehicles.”  He continued, “I 
personally observed Iraqi attempts to decontaminate captured Iranian equipment – no need to do 
so unless they knew they had used chemicals.”  This implied Iraq used VX gas for the first time 
in the war.  Within a week the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 582 and called for an 
immediate ceasefire followed by international arbitration of all aspects of the conflict.  This 
resolution was passed because Iran had taken the peninsula and it appeared that Iraq may 
actually fall to the Islamic Revolutionary movement.  As usual, Iraq accepted the resolution.  A 
day later, Iran launched Dawn 9 in Kurdistan in an attempt to seize Sulaymaniah and Halabja, 
thereby rejecting the proposed ceasefire.58 
 On July 16, 1986 Saddam Hussein had himself reelected as secretary general of the 
Ba’ath Party and president of the Revolutionary Command Council as a way to show Iran the 
people supported him.  A week later he sent a letter to Tehran offering the chance at an 
honorable peace, but Iran declined.  The year also included the destruction of the oil industry in 
both countries, a stalemate on both ground and air by the end of the year, and the first time the 
United States publicly condemned Iraq’s use of chemical weapons.  These events may have 
characterized 1986 however, the Iran-Contra affair overshadowed them all and its effects altered 
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the course of the Iran-Iraq War.  At the direction of the National Security Council and President 
Reagan, the CIA constructed a trade network between Iran, Israel, and the Contras fighting the 
Sandinista regime in Nicaragua without consulting Congress. Through Israel the United States 
sent Iran 2,500 TOW anti-tank missiles and 300 Hawk anti-air missiles in return for the release 
of just three hostages held in Lebanon and finances to send to the Contras fighting communism 
in Latin America.  A leak to the Lebanese magazine Ash- 
   The Iranians Capture al-Faw (February 9-March 11, 1986)59 
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Shiraa on November 3, 1986 revealed the secret American involvement and shipment of 
weapons to Iran.  Saddam was furious the United States was dealing to both nations, especially 
when he discovered the CIA had given Tehran satellite imagery showing Iraqi locations on the 
front.  These images had helped Iran capture the al-Faw peninsula the year before.  Still, Saddam 
played a diplomatic role and took advantage of American guilt as he asked for more financial 
assistance and intelligence reports.  Washington agreed to provide more imagery and data to 
Baghdad and also turned a blind eye to Iraq’s growing use of chemical weapons.60   
As the sixth year of the war drew to a close Ayatollah Khomeini released a fatwa asking 
the armed forces to defeat Iraq by Norwuz, the Persian New Year, on March 21, 1987 because 
the war was becoming counterproductive and costly.  Speaker of Parliament, Rafsanjani, chose 
to begin immediately and launched Operation Karbala 4 on Christmas Eve night 1986.  The 
frontal attack launched at the city of Basra was repelled by the motivated Iraqi lines who knew 
the city’s safety rested directly on their shoulders.  Rafsanjani’s plan had failed within seventy-
two hours and had cost Iran eight thousand soldiers.  His political career was on the line, and in 
typical fashion he tried to save it with another offensive on Basra.  This time he chose to commit 
“every available combatant to the battle” so that “the fight would be all-out and merciless.”  
Karbala 5 commenced on January 8, 1987 and was successful in bringing the Iranians to the 
Jassem Canal, just ten miles from Basra, and in bringing Saddam to the front to check on his 
defenses.  Here he gave the orders to again use chemical weapons against Iranian soldiers to 
prevent them from taking the city.  Four days later, Karabla 6 was launched further north in the 
vicinity of Sumer in an attempt to take the city of Mandali (which controlled the road to 
Baghdad), and force Iraqi reserves away from Basra.  By January 21 the front near Basra 
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stabilized and Saddam issued a radio broadcast announcing his plan for comprehensive peace 
between the two nations.  His main principles included the complete withdrawal of armed forces 
to internationally recognized borders, the exchange of all prisoners of war, the signing of a 
nonaggression treaty, and a promise to stay out of the other’s internal affairs.  Two days later, 
Iran rejected the plan again requiring that Saddam step down.61 
 Iran’s failure to negotiate an end to the war meant they needed to win before the Persian 
New Year.  A 150,000-man force replenished the Iranian lines at the Jassem Canal allowing 
them to cross and move within seven miles of the city.  As a last line of defense, Iraq shelled the 
enemy’s encampments and flew Ilyushin 76 four-engine jets high above the battlefield to release 
pallets of napalm.  This gas horribly burned Iranian soldiers, but the human wave assaults 
continued until February 26 when they ran out of ammunition and motivation.  A Karbala 7 
offensive in Kurdistan in early March failed to crush the Iraqi regime and ended hopes of 
defeating Iraq in time to meet the Ayatollah Khomeini’s deadline.  Still, the war waged on and 
Karbala 8 was initiated a month later as Pasdaran forces again tried to reach Basra.  The 
significant part of this offensive came between April 9 and April 12 as Iranian artillery poured 
phosgene gas on the Iraqi 3rd Army Corps defending the city.  This marked the first time Iranian 
leaders went against their religious principles and utilized chemical weapons.  Although 
relatively ineffective, it killed twenty and wounded two hundred, it led Iraqi intelligence to 
investigate Iranian chemical activities.  The search revealed Iran was developing tabun gas in 
Marvdasht near Shiraz with North Korean help.  In retaliation, the Iraqis dropped mustard gas on 
the Iranians outside of Basra.  In mid-April the Iranians ended the assaults on Basra.  Historian 
Razoux observed, “The exhausted Iranian army no longer had the necessary resources to 
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maintain these costly all-out offensives.  The Iraqi army was probably not ready to go back on 
the offensive, but it was strong enough to durably resist Iranian military pressure.  The stalemate 
on the terrestrial front was total.”62 
 The Supreme Defense Council in Tehran returned to their previous strategy of attrition 
and so began a war situated heavily in the Persian Gulf.  Naval and air strikes against oil tankers 
were common from both sides with Iraq hoping to hurt Iran’s financial ability to restock 
weapons and ammunition while Iran hoped to hurt the oil industry in the Gulf monarchies and 
force them to encourage Saddam to step down.  In July, Saddam unilaterally prohibited attacks in 
the Gulf to incentivize Iran to accept the peace plan proposed by the United Nations Security 
Council on June 23.  This plan was similar to Saddam’s 1986 proposal as it demanded an 
immediate end to hostilities, the withdrawal of troops to international borders, and the exchange 
of prisoners of war.  It also required mediation by the United Nations Secretary General.  
Additionally, this plan called for an impartial organization to investigate the origins of the war 
and recognized Iran’s right to war reparations.  On July 20, the Security Council unanimously 
passed Resolution 598 which included this peace plan and sent a team of impartial observers to 
oversee a ceasefire if accepted by both sides.  For the first time, Iran did not reject the resolution 
outright.  They now needed a way out of the war, and since their attrition strategy had not 
worked the resolution was the next best option.  Still, Tehran did not accept the plan and a 
ceasefire did not come to fruition.63 
 The first seven years of the war are characterized by this trend of non-binding resolutions 
being called for and accepted by one belligerent and then rejected by the other.  The vast 
majority of these occurrences come from Iraq’s willingness to negotiate and Iran’s steadfast 
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denial throughout the years 1982 to 1987.  The lack of international authority and the 
inflexibility of the Ayatollah Khomeini allowed the war to continue and led to horrific 
battlefields littered with bodies of soldiers who were often victims of a variety of chemical 
agents.  Sadly, the worst of these attacks was yet to come.    
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 THE HALABJA MASSACRE AND ANFAL CAMPAIGN 
 
Saddam’s decision to employ gas as a weapon was a calculated decision allowing “the 
Iraqis to kill the maximum number of enemy at the lowest unit cost.”  Inflicting casualties on 
armed enemies of the regime can be understood through wartime logic.  Collateral damage and 
the impact of the war on civilians is often overlooked as a secondary issue and regarded simply 
as the cost of war.  It is more complex however, when groups of civilians within the regime’s 
borders become the enemy and take up arms to assist the opposition.  Saddam Hussein was 
forced to address this issue as the Iraqi Kurdistan population alternated allegiances throughout 
the Iran-Iraq War.64   
The history of the Kurds in Iraq is equally as complex.  The Kurdish people cannot be 
identified solely by certain ethnic or linguistic characteristics.  They share no common dialect, 
religion, homeland, or origin.  The Arabs discovered the term “Kurd” when they conquered 
Mesopotamia in the seventh century and the word has remained to define the nomadic people in 
the region ever since.  Traditionally, the region inhabited by the Kurds included the mountains 
near the borders of Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey, but they have never had their own independent 
state with their own sovereign borders.  During Great Britain’s control over Iraq following the 
First World War, Winston Churchill kept the Kurdistan region under the close supervision of a 
British High Commissioner because he feared the minority would be oppressed by the 
surrounding Arab leaders.  In 1921, he returned some power to the Kurds when he “agreed the 
Kurdish areas should be included in Iraq and should participate in the National Assembly” yet 
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still have local autonomy.  When Iraq received its independence in 1932 it joined the League of 
Nations under the condition that it must protect the rights of the Kurdish people as a minority 
group in their new state.65   
These changes allowed the growth of Kurdish political movements in Iraq.  The 
Kurdistan Democratic Party was established by Mullah Mustafa Barzani, a young Kurdish leader 
who began the Kurdish national movement after the fall of the British monarchy.  He was exiled 
to Iran in 1945 and from there created the KDP.  After his return in 1958 he re-launched his 
nationalist campaign in 1961 which gained momentum in the power vacuum left by the British.  
The new and weak Ba’ath regime permitted the Kurdish regional government some autonomy in 
1968, but revoked that autonomy after a dispute over the oil-rich lands near Kirkuk.  The 
Kurdish revolt in regards to control of Kirkuk in 1974 led the Shah of Iran, previously the Kurds’ 
main ally, to make a deal with Baghdad and withdraw his support for the KDP.66  This loss split 
the KDP into Jalal Talabani’s Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the remainder of 
Barzani’s KDP.  As the two largest political parties in Kurdistan, both played a large role in the 
war.  The KDP sided with Iran, and the PUK initially sided with Iraq, but they later joined Iran 
as well in 1985.67 
Kurdish involvement in the war began early as Iranian offensives entered Kurdistan 
shortly after Tehran took the initiative in 1982.  They assisted the Iranian Val-Fajr II offensive in  
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July and August 1983 in an attempt to drive out Iranian Kurdish rebels belonging to Abd-al-
Rahman Qasemlou’s Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDP-I).  The Iran-KDP-allied attack 
and capture of Haj Omran on the Iran-Iraq border in July led to retaliatory chemical weapons 
strikes by Saddam Hussein.  As punishment for their assistance to the Iranian offensive, the 
Ba’ath regime rounded up five to eight thousand of the Barzani tribe of the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party (KDP).  These Kurds were never seen again.  When asked later about the 
disappearances, Saddam simply commented, “They betrayed the country and the covenant so we 
punished them severely and they went to hell.”69 
Kurdish operations continued in the north for the remainder of the war, and the alliance 
against Baghdad grew stronger.  In October 1986, the PUK and its new Iranian allies dealt a 
blow to the Iraqis with an attack on Kirkuk, simultaneously sending a message of their alliance.  
Then, under pressure from Iran in the spring of 1987, the KDP and PUK released each other’s 
prisoners, reconciled their differences from thirteen years ago, and united as the Kurdistan Front.  
The new coalition retook the region given to them in the 1974 Ba’ath autonomy agreement, led 
protests, harassed convoys and initiated attacks on cities.  The PUK was significantly involved in 
Operations Fath 4 through Operation Fath 7 on Erbil, Sulaymaniah Kirkuk, Mosul, while the 
KDP worked with Iran in Operation Karbala 7 as well as through the skirmishes on Iraqi 
garrisons near Rawanduz, Haj Omran, and Zakho on the border. 70    
On April 9, 1987 Saddam’s presidential convoy was attacked resulting in the death of his 
chauffeur and ten guards.  Saddam himself escaped unharmed, but came to realize his approach 
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in Kurdistan was not effective.  In response, Saddam initiated the Anfal Campaign71 and 
appointed his cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid, as the leader of the Northern Bureau in Kirkuk.  
Chemical Ali, as he became known, chose to breakdown the relationship between the insurgents 
and the civilians who supported them through the use of gas.  He depopulated the countryside 
through a village demolition campaign, and planned to “use gas to flush villagers from their 
homes, gather them up, take them to faraway sites, and dispose of them – bury them under the 
desert sands and thereby end the Kurdish rebellion forever.”72 
Historian and author of A Poisonous Affair, Joost Hiltermann, described the Anfal 
campaign accurately and relayed its harsh realities.  “A counterinsurgency operation launched by 
the Saddam Hussein regime in the waning days of the Iran-Iraq war to decisively settle its 
Kurdish problem, the Anfal campaign led to the methodical murder of tens of thousands of 
Kurdish civilians—first flushed out of their villages by poison gas, then hauled to transit centers, 
sorted by age and sex, and carted off to execution sites in Iraq’s western desert, far from 
Kurdistan,” he wrote.  These attacks were intended to harass and kill armed Kurdish forces, 
punish civilians who supported these forces, and instill so much terror in the population that 
citizens would flee into the open arms of the Iraqi army for transportation to one of the nearby 
mass graves.73   
Chemical Ali launched the first gas attack on Iraqi, rather than Iranian, forces in the 
Balisan Valley on April 16, 1987.  A survivor of this attack explained:  
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It was like a fog.  And then everyone became blind.  Some vomited.  Faces turned 
black; people experienced painful swellings under the arm, and women under their 
breasts.  Later, a yellow watery discharge would ooze from the eyes and nose.  
Many of those who survived suffered severe vision disturbances, or total blindness 
for up to a month … Some villagers ran into the mountains and died there.  Others, 
who had been closer to the place of impact of the bombs, died where they stood.74 
A second survivor and mother reported her experience from the attack:  
My daughter Narjis came to me, complaining about pain in her eyes, chest and 
stomach.  When I got close to see what was wrong with her, she threw up all over 
me … When I took her in to wash her face … all my other children were throwing 
up … Then my condition got bad, too.  And that’s when we realized that the weapon 
was poisonous and chemical.  I went for four days without eyesight.  My children 
could not see.  I was just screaming.  On the fifth day I slightly opened my eyes.  
And it was a terrible scene.  My children and my skin had turned black.75 
These stories are testaments to the horrors Saddam Hussein, Chemical Ali, and the Ba’ath Regime 
created during the war. 
 Two months later Chemical Ali issued new standing orders from the city of Kirkuk. 
These orders established prohibited localities or zones and instructed any human or animal found 
within these zones to be killed on site.  His second order, Directive SF/4800 on June 20, 
commanded his ranks to carry out as many “special” artillery strikes (implying gas attacks) as 
possible in these areas. In addition, he dictated, “All persons captured in those villages shall be 
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detained and interrogated by the security services and those between the ages of 15 and 70 shall 
be executed after any useful information has been obtained from them.”  Ali’s campaign 
destroyed Kurdish villages, executed Kurds found with weapons regardless of a lack of evidence 
of rebel affiliation, bombed or shelled cities prior to their complete evacuation, prohibited the 
teaching of Kurdish in schools, and instilled heavy sanctions on anyone caught speaking the 
language.76	
By the end of the war, civilians across Kurdistan experienced the cruel and inhumane 
Anfal assaults.  Though all the attacks were gruesome and horrific, the attack on Halabja in 
March 1988 may top the list.  Kurdish resistance had controlled a large swath of land from 
Suleimaniyeh to Kirkuk a year earlier and with support from Iran, planned an offensive aimed at 
seizing Halabja.  Halabja offered multiple advantages for the Iranians.  An attack in the north 
would reduce pressure on their forces in the south and help relations with the Gulf States, but 
would also allow Iran to grab territory in Iraq before the war ended, fight Iranian Kurdish rebels 
who used Iraqi Kurdistan as a base of operations, and allow the Kurds to take most of the 
casualties in the assault. 77 
  These Kurds had laid siege to Saddam’s regime, using guerilla warfare to strike the 
party headquarters, secret police, military intelligence, and other Iraqi assets for years, and were 
prepared to make a larger strike at Halabja.  The town, easily defendable once secured, was 
surrounded by mountains in the southeast and shielded to the north and west by man-made 
defenses like Lake Sirwan and natural ones like the Zalm River.  On March 13, 1988 Iranian 
Generals Sohrabi and Shirazi launched a two-pronged offensive into the region.  Operation 
Victory 7 had the objective of seizing the Dukan Dam just twenty miles north of Sulaymaniah 
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while the mission of Operation Holy City 3 was to seize Halabja in order to prevent access to the 
Darbandikhan Dam to the town’s south.  By taking both of Iraq’s largest hydroelectric dams, 
Iran hoped to divest Iraq of its electricity.  KDP units with help from Iranian Pasdaran forces 
secured the bridge across the Zalm, the only escape route from Halabja, while Pasdaran and PUK 
forces took strategic mountaintops from the Iraqis and defeated Iraqi troops guarding the large 
artillery base at Delmar, the main threat to Halabja.  Through these efforts the Iranian coalition 
forces managed to take Halabja by March 15.78    
The following day, Saddam executed Colonel Jafar Sadeq who had retreated from the 
Dukan Dam as well as other officers who had lost him Halabja.  Fearing that Iran would cut off 
Iraq’s electricity, poison the water supply, or flood the region Saddam ordered Ali to intensify 
the Anfal Campaign and erase the town of Halabja with chemical attacks.  Saddam wanted to kill 
as many Kurdish rebels and Iranian soldiers as he could, regardless of the effect on the rest of the 
population.  Audiotapes from the middle of a meeting between Saddam and his council are 
incriminating as Saddam is heard repeatedly yelling, “Kill them all!”  On March 16, Saddam’s 
strikes began.  Ten MiG-23s flew over Halabja and dropped containers of napalm creating both a 
wall of fire within and around the city.  Shortly after, several Pilatus aircraft followed and 
unleashed a violent cocktail of chemical agents that included mustard, phosgene, tabun, and sarin 
gas.  Artillery shells continued to raze the city for hours.  Eyewitness and survivor, Hama Hama 
Sa’id, claimed, “he saw six Soviet-made Sukhoy bombers fly over, then another three separately, 
and another two.  They dropped their bombs over Halabja.  ‘Smoke rose: some was white, some 
black, some red, some mixed.  I saw people putting their hands over their faces.’”  These 
individuals probably never raised their hands again.  Conventional bombings first decimated 
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structures and broke windows, allowing the next waves of poison gas bombs to easily penetrate 
into shelters.  The excruciatingly painful deaths of its victims are seen in photographs taken after 
the event and before the remains of the Kurds could be collected off the roads leading out of 
Halabja and placed in mass graves.  Indra Sinha cites a Washington Times article in her research 
that recounts “A father [who] died trying to protect his child from the white cloud of cyanide 
vapor.  A mother [who] lies cradling her baby alongside a minibus […] Yards away, a mother, 
father, and daughter lie side by side.”  In total, it is estimated three to five thousand individuals 
died at Halabja with an additional 10,000 wounded from the attack.79   
It is important to note that apart from reconnaissance and intelligence officers, Iranian 
troops were not in the town prior to the chemical attack.  Saddam Hussein chose to use sarin gas 
in a town he knew contained a majority of Iraqi citizens, Kurdish or not.  Hiltermann explains, 
“Regardless of Iran’s role, Iraq consciously and deliberately retaliated with a poison gas attack 
against a civilian population, a crime against humanity that cannot be justified by the defeat of its 
ground forces.”  The several thousand casualties sustained during the Halabja attack once again 
called for international intervention.80 
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4 
THE AMERICAN RESPONSE TO HALABJA 
 
 The fact the international community, and specifically the United States, failed to take 
action against the Iraqi regime and execute the necessary measures to prevent the use of 
chemical weapons is appalling and shameful to an outsider looking in.  Surely, this inaction, at a 
minimum, indirectly contributed to the attacks on Halabja.  Should these nations have done 
something to control Saddam’s military actions?  Why did the United States government not take 
responsibility and condemn Baghdad?  Did the American public agree with the government’s 
indifferent stance?  Regardless of the political and diplomatic reasons for inaction, is it ever 
acceptable for world leaders to allow the continuance of what some argue was genocide?  
International relations and discipline is always a complex subject and one that is further 
complicated when the actions under investigation occur internally within a sovereign nations’ 
own borders.  This chapter argues the United States’ and United Nations’ failure to effectively 
condemn Iraq’s use of poison gas against Iran prior to 1988 led to Saddam’s willingness to 
launch the Anfal campaign against the Kurds and drop mustard and tabun gas on Halabja.  
Additionally, the lack of punishment after the war gave Saddam the confidence to invade Kuwait 
just three years later. 
 The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) first discovered the use of chemical weapons in 
the war in August 1983 against Iranian soldiers and members of the Kurdistan Democratic Party 
at Haj Omran and Penjwin.  At this point, the United States had provided Iraq with intelligence 
on Iranian troop movements, launched Operation Staunch, and extended credit to help with 
Iraq’s financial crisis, but had not restored diplomatic relations with Baghdad.  If Washington 
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was to condemn the violation of the Geneva Protocol one may imagine this would be the 
appropriate time.  Yet, these relations were not reestablished as the Reagan Administration 
preferred to keep the option on the table.  An immediate condemnation or announcement that 
ending the use of chemical weaponry was required for Baghdad and Washington to restore 
relations would have ensured there would be no relations at all.  It would kill any diplomatic 
reestablishment.  Resolution 540, issued by the UN in October 1983, simply encouraged both 
belligerents to end hostilities under the Secretary General’s mediation, denounced all 
humanitarian rights violations, and urged all nations to refrain from actions that would escalate 
the war.  Typically, UN resolutions are considered non-binding and require the consent of all 
parties involved in order to be enforced.  Only resolutions passed under Chapter Seven of the UN 
Charter allow the Security Council to employ military force in order to implement their 
decisions.  Despite the adoption of numerous voluntary resolutions, the Security Council never 
passed a resolution under Chapter Seven during the Iran-Iraq war. 81  
 As a result, Resolution 540 was never enforced and Saddam assumed he had been given 
the signal for the continued use of chemical weapons.  When Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld met with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in December 1983 he failed to firmly 
explain the United States’ concerns over chemical weapons use, war escalation, and human 
rights violations.  This nonchalant approach to the meeting may have also encouraged Saddam to 
believe Washington would turn a blind eye to his tactics.  On February 21, 1984, Iraqi high 
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command announced, “the invaders [Iran] should know that for every harmful insect there is an 
insecticide capable of annihilating it whatever their number and that Iraq possesses this 
annihilation insecticide.”  This comment, given voluntarily by Iraq, allowed the United States to 
now publically discuss the use of chemical warfare in the conflict.  The State Department 
Country Officer for Iraq at the time, Francis Ricciardone, later explained Washington knew 
about chemical attacks and the shipment of chemicals from West Germany to Iraq prior to 
Christmas 1983 yet said nothing publically to protect the sources.  He believed the use of 
chemical warfare would cause conflict escalation in the region and limit the ability of the United 
States to help Iraq internationally, but now that the news was out, the United States could freely 
condemn the use of poison gas by Iraq which they did on March 5, 1984. 82 
The March 1984 condemnation of chemical weapons use resulted in a series of 
diplomatic actions between the United States and Iraq.  Baghdad immediately fired back at the 
United States arguing they were “hypocritical…the last country with the right to speak about the 
ethics of war” in reference to the United States use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki to end World War II.  About the same time, United Nations’ investigators discovered 
the remains of ten aerial bombs along the Iran-Iraq border.  Nine of these were damaged but 
were believed to be bombs designed to spread some type of liquid.  The remaining bomb had not 
exploded and the yellow band around the nose cone was still visible.  After being dismantled and 
examined in Tehran the shells were revealed to have a “dark brown, oily liquid” inside that 
tested positive for mustard gas.  Another sample was sent to Sweden and Switzerland where 
scientists discovered both mustard and tabun gas.  With this knowledge, Secretary Rumsfeld 
returned to Aziz on March 26 to ease tensions.  He promised, “Our CW [chemical weapons] 
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condemnation was made strictly out of our strong opposition to the use of lethal and 
incapacitating CW, wherever it occurs … Our interest in (1) preventing an Iranian victory, and 
(2) continuing to improve bilateral relations with Iraq, at a pace of Iraq’s choosing, remain 
unchanged.”  The National Security Decision Directive 139 confirmed on April 5 further tilted 
Washington’s allegiance towards Iraq.  The document stated, “The Secretary of State, in 
coordination with the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 
will prepare a plan of action designed to avert an Iraqi collapse,” and will do so by evaluating 
Iraqi military needs, providing improved intelligence, and encouraging allies like France and 
Jordan to do the same.  The Directive continued by pledging American support to the Geneva 
Protocol, condemning the use of chemical weapons, and stating, “Our condemnation of the use 
of CW munitions by the belligerents should place equal stress on the urgent need to dissuade Iran 
from continuing the ruthless and inhumane tactics which have characterized recent offensives.”83 
Despite a widespread international ban on the export of certain key chemicals (strictly 
precursors to poison gases)84 to either belligerent, the United States and Iraq reestablished 
diplomatic relations in November 1984.  When Secretary of State George Shultz and Tariq Aziz 
met, Shultz reminded his counterpart of the United States’ stance on chemical weapons and that 
his concerns not only applied to Iraq but to the war as a whole.  Still, Washington believed 
chemical weapons to be a lesser evil than the spread of the Islamic Revolution throughout the 
Middle East.  When Iraq conducted tabun attacks during the 1985 Iranian Badr Offensive along 
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the Baghdad-Basra highway, Shultz privately pressured Aziz, but remained cautious when 
issuing any statements to the public.  State Department spokesman, Bernard Kalb, put it simply, 
“The Iraqi government is aware of the fact that the US government strongly condemns the lethal 
use of chemical weapons” and went on to cite the proof of Iraqi violations provided by European 
doctors sent to treat Iranian victims in 1985.  The lack of effective international response to 
Tehran’s call for help led Iranian United Nations envoy, Sa’id Rajaie Khorassani, to believe, “the 
UN was so preoccupied with bringing about a ceasefire that it was willing to overlook a serious 
breach of international law, and that perhaps it even believed that gas use, however disturbing, 
might help bring the war to an end.”85 
 The year 1986 proved to be a difficult time in the realm of international relations.  That 
spring, misinformed United States’ intelligence notified Saddam that the Iranian attack near the 
al-Faw peninsula was only a diversion and the main attack would come further north.  Saddam’s 
transfer of troops in accordance with this intelligence resulted in the loss of the peninsula, which 
was truly Tehran’s mission.  Saddam’s subsequent doubt of the United States’ loyalty was 
deepened when the news of the Iran-Contra Affair broke in November of the same year.  
President Reagan attempted to explain the weapons sold to Iran were defensive and were not 
intended to give Iran an advantage or prolong the war.  Regardless, with the United States’ 
embarrassment and morality in question, Washington was less likely to criticize any of Saddam’s 
military choices, especially when one could claim that, so far, Iraq had only used poison gas 
defensively to counter aggressive Iranian offensives.86 
In turn, the late 1986 and early 1987 Iranian offensives that killed hundreds of civilians in 
Basra were countered with Iraqi strikes on Iranian ships and oil facilities.  Iran’s retaliation and 
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use of Scud missiles to destroy ships in the Persian Gulf belonging to Iraq’s allies did not please 
the United States, especially since many Kuwaiti ships were hit.  In July 1987, the United States 
showed its Arab support and placed its flags on Kuwaiti ships.  President Reagan furthered the 
gesture by writing to Saddam to promise, “We are committed to help deal with the negative 
effects of Iran’s intransigent pursuit of war, its threat to the security of the Gulf countries, and its 
threat to freedom of navigation in the Gulf,” as well as continued to fight for Resolution 598 in 
the United Nations.  The end of 1986 marked the moment when Saddam and Iraq were able to 
fully and effectively integrate chemical weapons use into their battle plans.  Prior to the al-Faw 
campaign Saddam held full control over the poison gas arsenal and his approval was required for 
each use.  After al-Faw, however, the command transferred to Iraqi operational commanders in 
order to improve flexibility and efficiency.  This minor but critical transfer of power explains 
why the Anfal Campaign was so intense.87 
So far the United States and international community had requested an end to hostilities 
through non-binding United Nations Security Council resolutions, condemned the use of poison 
gas and bombs against civilians, and investigated the use of chemical weapons on soldiers and 
civilians alike.  These soldiers and civilians were national enemies of the pilots dropping the 
bombs or the artillerymen arcing shells over the border.  The change in 1987 separated Iraqi 
attacks prior to this year which had mainly been against Iranian military members, from those 
post-1987 attacks targeting Iraqi civilians in Kurdistan.88 
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Iran reported the attack on Halabja to the United Nations Security Council on March 18, 
1988 and received little to no response from the international community.  Assistant Secretary of 
State, Richard Murphy, did not address the attack in his speech on the war on March 22 and the 
United States government said nothing except to continue condemning both sides for their use of 
chemical warfare in the conflict, despite the fact there was no evidence Iran used chemical 
warfare at Halabja.  Seven weeks went by before the United Nations released Resolution 612 on 
May 9, 1988.  This resolution condemned the continued use of chemical warfare and again asked 
each belligerent to comply with the 1925 Geneva Protocol, never explicitly explaining who was 
at fault for Halabja.  The United States supported the resolution, but expressed their continued 
displeasure with both nations’ use of chemical weapons, implying Iran also had a role to play in 
the March 16 attack.  David Ottoway’s 1988 New York Times article, however, explained the 
“evidence collected by U.S. intelligence agencies of purported Iranian chemical warfare use was 
far less convincing than the startling evidence of Iraqi chemical attacks provided by television 
cameras that filmed scores of dead Iraqi Kurds in the northern Iraqi border town of Halabja.”    
This attack differed from previous chemical attacks because Iran immediately allowed western 
reporters onto the scene to witness the rotting bodies and confirm the use of chemical weapons.  
The media’s photographs brought the horrors of poison gas into the homes of families around the 
world.  Zach Fredman, author of the article “Shoring Up Iraq, 1983 to 1990: Washington and the 
Chemical Weapons Controversy” explains, “Americans and other Westerners had seen headlines 
about Iraqi chemical weapons use from time to time, but they never before saw photographs and 
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videos of dead Kurdish women and children.”  Because of this media frenzy the United States 
condemned Iraq for the attack, but also made a point to publicize Iran’s supposed role. 89   
The United States State Department’s response to the Halabja attack epitomized their 
stance in regards to the war.  Department of State spokesman Charles Redman told the world 
there were “indications that Iran may have also used chemical artillery shells in the fighting” but 
offered no evidence.  Richard Murphy, the Assistant Secretary of State further discussed the 
Kurdish issue with Iraq and reaffirmed the President’s commitment to Iraq and the United States’ 
refusal to “support any individuals or groups who threaten Iraq’s unity and territorial integrity.”  
The Department instructed its members to respond to any questions with the line, “The U.S. 
believes that both Iraq and Iran used chemical weapons in the fighting around Halabja.”  And, if 
pressed for any further information to say, “While we have concluded there was Iranian use, we 
cannot discuss the information from which we have drawn our conclusion.”  These findings 
show the accusation of Iran was simply a diplomatic scheme to help Iraq avoid sole international 
condemnation.  Iraq also found a way to put a turn on the international view of chemical 
weapons in the war.  During the second Anfal campaign in the Zerda Mountains on March 30, 
1988 the mustard and nerve gases blew back into Iraqi formations injuring multiple soldiers.  
Iraq paraded these victims around to draw the attention of the United Nations and accuse Iran of 
being at fault for the attack.  To the common man, knowledge that both nations had victims of 
chemical warfare may appear as if both sides had used poison gas, when in truth there was only 
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hard evidence for one side.  Historian Hiltermann explains, “In the final analysis the only 
evidence we have for the convenient claim that Iran used chemical weapons during the war is 
that the US government, with all its intelligence capabilities and diplomatic weight, said so.  And 
the antipathy for Iran was such that no one cared to question that statement” 90 
As expected, some members of the United States government opposed this stance of 
inaction and proposed to place sanctions on Iraq to keep them from using illegal weaponry.  
These sanctions proposed and approved in Senate Resolution 408 in April 1988 explicitly 
blamed Iraq for its use of chemical weapons and called for the end of chemical exportation to 
countries seeking to develop chemical weapons, the prevention of Iranian development of 
chemical weapons, and the pursuit of a ban on the production, use, or transfer of chemical 
weapons.  This stance taken by the Senate differs starkly from the one held in 1984 when the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported on the Iran-Iraq war and failed to mention any use 
of chemical weapons by Iraq.  The new stance continued after the September attacks with the 
Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988.  This act would prevent the United States from loaning any 
money, selling any military equipment or banned exports, or extending credit to Iraq, and 
prohibited the importation of oil from Iraq.  Although the Reagan White House killed this bill, it 
showed that some members of the government opposed the United States’ policy towards the 
Iran-Iraq War and favored the application of sanctions on Baghdad in hopes that it would end the 
genocide.  Those that opposed the bill, such as the State Department represented by Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Peter Burleigh, argued, “We do 
not believe sanctions now would bring us closer to the objective we share with this committee of 
ending chemical weapons use by Iraq once and for all.”  He continued, “We believe that the 
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passage of this legislation now would undercut our efforts with Iraq and damage US exporters 
without furthering the goal of ending use by Iraq of chemical weapons.”  His views were shared 
by the President, and the United States allowed Saddam’s regime to continue without economic 
punishment.91 
Having only been delivered a slap on the hand by the United States, Saddam was given a 
final opportunity to accomplish his goals.  He launched the Tawakalna ala Allah (Trust in God) 
campaigns in the south near Fish Lake and continued the Anfal campaign in Kurdistan to force 
the Iranians to accept the ceasefire.  Six more Anfal campaigns ravaged the rural north and each 
began with a day of chemical attacks designed to flush out rebel Kurdish forces living in the 
mountains.  The fleeing rebels were caught by Iraqi troops, sent to holding centers, and 
transported to the Popular Army base at Topzawa just outside of Kirkuk for separation and 
execution.  Those not executed were sent to the Nugrat Salman prison in the desert near Samawa 
in southern Iraq.  Here a lack of food and medical care resulted in the deaths of many more.  
Historian Mike Tucker reveals the stories of Kurdish prisoners in camps such as Nugrat Salman.  
Halima Mohsen, a woman taken during the Gizi village massacre in August 1988 recalls how the 
Iraqis “held guns on us” and “beat our men with steel cables, with wooden clubs, with leather 
whips, and with steel chains.”  Those that survived were released on September 6 when an 
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amnesty was reached to end the Anfal campaigns.  Very few reports of these actions reached the 
international community.  United States DIA analyst Rick Francona who worked as the Iraqi 
Military Intelligence liaison claimed to have never heard about the Anfal campaign while he was 
there.  United States ambassador to Iraq David Newton explained it differently, “We did know 
that villages were being razed and that people were being taken to the desert.  We had the 
impression they were being executed […] What nobody realized at the time was the scale of the 
campaign.”92   
The United States’ stance on the attack at Halabja remained largely indifferent due to 
what appeared to be mixed understandings of events within Washington.  Halabja was simply an 
event that happened within an ally’s borders that Washington chose to forget.  Once Iran 
accepted the ceasefire and the war officially ended, the United States could more publically 
condemn Saddam Hussein’s tactics, but it was too little too late.  The issue remained under the 
rug until the 1991 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.  All of a sudden, the political and military goals of 
Saddam’s regime did not align with the United States’.  “Thus,” as Dr. Sharat G. Lin writes in 
his article titled “Lying about Halabja: Justifying the Invasion of Iraq,” “when it did not suit US 
policy in the Gulf, the Halabja incident was virtually ignored.  But as soon as Iraq fell out of 
favor, Halabja, al-Anfal, and unilateral Iraqi chemical weapons use suddenly became serious 
human rights concerns.”  Washington used these gas attacks from the war to turn their backs on 
Saddam and fight to help the Kuwaitis being invaded.  Even Congress was finally able to cut 
$700 million in loan guarantees to Iraq through a bill passed on July 27, 1990.93 
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After the Gulf War, the attacks were again forgotten for almost a decade.  The issue was 
not brought up until March 16, 2000 when the United States State Department spokesman, James 
Rubin, articulated, “We are working towards the day when those ultimately responsible for the 
decision to order the poison gas bombardment of Halabja can be brought to justice before an 
international tribunal, in a free and democratic Iraq, or wherever they may be found.”  Even after 
September 11, 2001 Washington needed more justification to enter the Middle East and again, 
Halabja became a primary reason.  On March 13, 2003 the Department of State issued a leaflet 
titled “Saddam’s Chemical Weapons Campaign: Halabja, March 16, 1988.”   This document 
labeled Saddam as the “first world leader in modern times to have brutally used chemical 
weapons against his own people” and that “his goals were to systematically terrorize and 
exterminate the Kurdish population in northern Iraq, to silence his critics, and to test the effects 
of his chemical and biological weapons.  Hussein launched chemical weapons attacks against 40 
Kurdish villages and thousands of innocent civilians in 1987-88, using them as testing grounds.”  
This is quite a different political stance from the one taken by Washington in 1984, 1986, or even 
directly after the Anfal Campaign in 1988.  As Dr. Lin declared, “Only when it came to a 
desperate search for pretexts to invade Iraq in 2003 did Halabja become a star – the star whose 
resurrected massacre would become the rallying cry for a new war on Iraq without end.”94 
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5 
 EPILOGUE 
 
The Tawakalna ala Allah operation launched by Iraq in May 1988 pushed Pasdaran 
forces back to the border.  Saddam Hussein managed to restore relations with Jalal Talabani and 
his Patriotic Union of Kurdistan as well as with Masoud Barzani and the Kurdistan Democratic 
Party.  In exchange for exclusively targeting Iranian troops in Kurdistan, the two Kurds agreed to 
quit expanding in the region.  Saddam’s goal was to drive Iran out of Iraq and he was willing to 
negotiate peacefully in order to do so.  Tawakalna ala Allah 2 at the Majnoon Islands and 
Hoveyzeh Marshes began a month later and resulted in a three-day battle and complete return of 
territory to Iraq.  The Iranians had lost all motivation.  By the time Saddam launched Tawakalna 
ala Allah 3 the Iraqis had full control, needing just one day to take the city of Dehloran and the 
oil fields on the Iranian side of the border.  Baghdad now held all the cards and demanded the 
withdrawal of any remaining Iranian troops from Iraqi Kurdistan.  If his demands were not met, 
Saddam planned to attack the Iranian oil-city of Ahwaz.  On July 14 and July 15 Iranian leaders 
decided to cede to his requests in order to end the war.  The Ayatollah Khomeini could not attend 
the meeting for health-related reasons but took responsibility for the decision to end the war in 
order to protect the political careers of Rafsanjani and Ali Khamenei.  On July 15 Rafsanjani 
withdrew all troops from Kurdistan and two days later Saddam Hussein listed his five conditions 
for peace: 1) direct negotiations between the two parties, 2) an immediate start to the United 
Nations cleanup of the Shatt al-Arab, 3) a guarantee of free navigation in the Persian Gulf for 
Iraq, 4) an end to Iranian attacks on maritime traffic, and 5) a direct prisoner exchange. 95  
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On the same day Saddam pulled his troops back to the border and Ali Khamenei sent 
word to the United Nations accepting Resolution 598 and stating the ceasefire would go into 
effect one month later.  Secretary General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar tried to lead negotiations 
between the two nations in New York City; however, Iran refused to recognize the Iraqi regime’s 
legitimacy.  In turn, Saddam initiated Tawakalna ala Allah 4 on July 22 and took thirty miles of 
Iranian territory and eight thousand prisoners near Qasr-e-Shirin and Hoveyzeh.  Finally, Iraqi 
Tariq Aziz and Iranian Ali Akbar Velayati met in New York with the Secretary General on July 
26.  Again, the belligerents had issues, this time relating to direct negotiations, the validity of the 
Algiers Agreement, and the prisoner exchange as both sides’ prisoners did not want to return to 
their country for fear of punishment.  Once again, Saddam went on the offensive.  Operation 
Eternal Light began that same day on the road to Kermanshah but was stalled by an Iranian 
counterattack.  Still, Iraqi raids continued until Iran finally accepted direct negotiations on 
August 6, 1988.  Here, Saddam agreed to a ceasefire and recognized the Algiers Agreement.  The 
following day Iran confirmed the ceasefire, accepted negotiations, and agreed to the right of free 
passage on the Shatt al-Arab.  Combat ended and on August 20 the ceasefire went into effect.  
Shortly after, a peacekeeping force of three hundred fifty observers from twenty-six countries, 
excluding Arab nations and those on the Security Council, arrived to monitor the border for the 
United Nations.96   
The war slowly but surely came to a close.  The two belligerent’s foreign ministers met 
on August 24 in Geneva, the Anfal campaigns ended on September 3, and Iran reestablished 
diplomatic relations with regional and European nations.  Both nations rebuilt their oil facilities 
and began a twenty-one-month prisoner exchange at the end of November.  The war officially  
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Iran-Iraq Front in 198897 
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ended when Iraq withdrew its last troops from Iran almost two years later on August 20, 1990, 
just eighteen days after it invaded Kuwait and began the Gulf War.98 
The use of chemical warfare by Iraq continued into the Gulf War, and it was not until 
three years later that the international community decided to restructure the rules surrounding 
chemical weapons.  The 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention dictated the constraints on 
chemical weapons development, production, stockpiling, trade, and use.  It became effective in 
April 1997 and augmented the Geneva Protocol of 1925.  It has been the most recent 
international document regarding chemical warfare.99   
After the Gulf War in 1991, the United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, passed 
under Chapter Seven, required Iraq to destroy all chemical weapons, stockpiles, and facilities; 
provide locations for these facilities; and allow a United Nations Special Commission to inspect 
them.  Between 1991 and 1998 the Commission discovered and removed 48 Scud missiles, 
38,000 chemical weapons munitions, 690 tons of chemical agents, and 3,000 tons of chemical 
weapons precursors.  The Commission was confident the majority of Iraq’s chemical warfare 
program had been eliminated, but Iraq’s lack of cooperation, surprising production of VX gas, 
and unaccounted-for chemical precursors left questions unanswered.  When inspections ended 
after 1998, Iraq and Saddam immediately returned to producing mustard, sarin, cylcosarin, and 
VX gas.  In 2001, behind a push from Britain and the United States, the Security Council 
approved Resolution 1441 under Chapter Seven because Iraq had not cooperated with the 
Special Commission and their inspections.  Consequently, the inspections were renewed in late 
November 2002 and carried out by the specially created United Nations Monitoring, Verification 
and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).  Even after these inspections the United States and 
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Britain did not believe Iraq was being truthful about their Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
programs and wanted another, more forceful resolution.  United Nations members like France, 
Germany, and Russia however, disagreed, and wanted to follow through with UNMOVIC.  The 
United States and Britain, in turn, launched Operation Iraqi Freedom on March 19, 2003 to end 
Saddam Hussein’s regime and eliminate his WMD threat.100 
United States forces captured Saddam Hussein at the end of 2003 and an Iraqi High 
Tribunal was created by the interim government to try the former dictator for his crimes.  
Saddam was first tried for his role in the torture and killing of 148 men and boys as part of the 
Dujail massacre in 1982.  The attack followed a failed assassination attempt on Saddam’s life 
and resulted in the death of a horrific number of Shi’ites from the opposing political party, the 
Dawa Party.  His second (of seven charges against him) related to the Anfal campaign.  Also 
tried for their crimes against the Kurds were Ali Hassan al-Majid (Chemical Ali; director of the 
Ba’athist Party’s Northern Bureau), Sultan Hashem Ahmed (military commander), Sabir Abdul 
Aziz al-Duri (Director of Military Intelligence), Hussein Rashid al-Tikriti (Deputy Director of 
Military Operations), Tahir Tawfiq al-Ani (the Governor of Mosul), and Farhan Mutlak al-
Jabouri (the Head of Military Intelligence in Northern Iraq).  All of these men were charged with 
crimes against humanity, but Saddam and Ali were also charged with genocide.  The trial, in 
order to sentence these two men for genocidal crimes, had to show they “killed the Kurds 
because they were Kurds, not because they were assisting Iraq’s enemy during the war.”  
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Additionally, the Iraqi High Tribunal did not need to be convinced of the men’s guilt beyond a 
reasonable doubt, but rather just be satisfied with the evidence provided in order to prosecute 
them.101 
In early November, Saddam was convicted of his crimes in the Dujail trial and sentenced 
to death.  His appeal was rejected on December 26, 2006 and his sentence was upheld.  His 
execution had to occur within the next thirty days.  The Anfal Trial had begun on August 21, 
2006 and was only halfway complete by this time.  Kurdish witnesses had poured forth to testify 
and share their stories of the horrors at the Nugrat Salman prison camp, the torture and rape of 
prisoners, the atrocities experienced in their home cities, the malnutrition and disease in 
detention centers, and the mass murder of families later placed in mass graves.  By the time of 
Saddam’s execution on December 30, 2006 the Anfal verdict had not been reached.  Rather than 
continue the trial posthumously, the Tribunal chose to drop the charges of genocide in the Anfal 
Trial after his death.  While the Tribunal and trial are often criticized for their illegitimacy, bias, 
and lack of independent international judges, the result allowed Saddam off the hook one last 
time.  The Shi’ites from Dujail may have gotten the justice they deserved, but the Kurds were 
robbed once again.  However, some justice was had when the remaining defendants’ verdicts 
were reached.  Chemical Ali, Hashem Ahmed, and Hussein Rashid al-Tikriti faced life sentences 
in 2007; Farhan Mutlak al-Jubouri and Sabir Abdul-Aziz al-Duri faced life imprisonment; and 
Tahir Tawfiq al-Ani was exonerated as per the prosecution’s request.102 
The Iran-Iraq War took the lives of 680,000 individuals (180,000 Iraqis and 500,000 
Iranians), and wounded and maimed an additional 1.5 million.  Eighty-five percent of these were 
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soldiers, 12 percent were Kurds, and 3 percent were civilians.  All in all, the war cost a total of 
$1,100 billion dollars in 1988 dollars.  It was characterized by the extensive use of chemical 
weapons which included 19,500 chemical bombs, over 54,000 chemical artillery shells, and 
27,000 short-range chemical-filled rockets, all from the Iraqi side.  Within these the regime 
loaded 1,800 tons of mustard gas, 140 tons of tabun, and more than 600 tons of sarin.  In turn, 
the use of these weapons during the Anfal campaign resulted in the deaths of 50,000 to 100,000 
Kurds, the resettlement of 1.5 million Kurds, and the forced flight of 60,000 Kurdish refugees to 
Turkey.  It is clear this war was horrifically unique.  This is a point that should not be overlooked 
for it not only allows one to understand why Saddam made the decisions he did, but also how the 
United States and United Nations helped him do so.103 
As mentioned in Chapter One, the rich and potent history of chemical warfare reaches 
back to the First World War and extends into modern battlefields as seen in present-day Syria.  
Throughout this timeline five major instances of confirmed chemical weapons use stand out: the 
Italo-Ethiopian War, Sino-Japanese War, Egyptian-Yemen War, Soviet-Afghan War, and the 
Iran-Iraq War.  What makes this last conflict different and worthy of this study is the reason for 
using those chemical weapons. 
 In his article, “Chemical Warfare: Act of Intimidation or Desperation,” author Robert 
Mandel asks three main questions to determine the how appropriate the use of chemical weapons 
was in these five conflicts.  Do leaders voluntarily choose to use chemical weapons or have they 
been forced into using them?  Are leaders using chemical weapons because they terrorize the 
population or because they can achieve strategic goals without causing collateral damage to 
cities, property, or the landscape?  Do leaders use chemical weapons early or late in the conflict 
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and do they use the technology as a last resort when all other available weapons have been 
exhausted?  The answers to these questions explain how the Iran-Iraq War was different and how 
Saddam’s use of chemical weaponry can be more easily understood considering the 
circumstances.104   
The Italians utilized chemical weapons a year into their war with Ethiopia (1935) and 
dropped tear gas grenades and barrels of mustard gas behind enemy lines in order to intimidate 
Ethiopian troops.  Their offensive use was intended to win the war before the League of Nations’ 
sanctions implemented as a result of the Geneva Protocol violation could permanently hurt the 
economy.  In sum, the Italians used chemical weapons offensively and early in the war when 
they were not in danger of losing, and before they had exhausted other options, like conventional 
bombings.  Japan utilized chemical weapons eleven days after their war with China began in 
1937 in order to instill terror and weaken the morale of unprepared Chinese soldiers.  Again, 
chemical weapons were used offensively before conventional methods had been tried.  The 
Japanese began the attacks almost immediately after the war commenced and at a point where 
losing the war was not a threat.  In the mid-twentieth century, Egypt initiated chemical warfare 
against Yemeni troops just months into the war through phosgene and mustard bombs, shells, 
and landmines.  Egypt’s experimental use quickly turned into an offensive terror.  It was not used 
as a last resort as other methods of warfare were still available.  The Soviets even used chemical 
warfare prior to their invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.  The use of phosgene, tabun, and VX gas 
through bombing, aerial spraying, rockets, and landmines resulted in the intimidation of Afghan 
troops.  The USSR was militarily superior to Afghanistan and had no need to use chemical 
																																																						
104 Robert Mandel, “Chemical Warfare: Act of Intimidation or Desperation?” Armed Sources & Society 19, no. 2 
(Winter 1993): 187-189, accessed February 19, 2019, 
http://eds.b.ebscohost.com/eds/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=2&sid=5f8ac396-494f-47c1-b486-
52adeaeae38b%40sessionmgr103. 
	 83 
weapons.  Their use did not even result in the end of the war.  The four examples described here 
share the same characteristics: they are offensive-minded uses of chemical weapons early on in 
conflict before other conventional approaches to war were tried or exhausted and while the 
aggressor had no need to worry about losing the war.105 
The Iran-Iraq War differs almost entirely.  The war began in September 1980 as the 
militarily superior Iraq invaded Iran who dominated in terms of manpower.  Despite Iraq’s 
preparedness to end the war shortly after their offensive stalled, Iran took the initiative and 
continued the war for an additional six years.  Iran’s human wave attacks and offensive push into 
Iraqi territory led Saddam to implement chemical weapons in 1983.  From tear gas in 1983 to 
mustard gas and tabun gas in 1984 to an increased use of these and other nerve agents until 1988, 
Iraq managed to defend its territory and drive back the Iranians.  Iraq and Saddam Hussein did 
not utilize chemical weapons offensively during their invasion in 1980-82.  The use of these 
weapons began when Iraq took up a defensive posture and after conventional bombings and 
warfare methods failed to stop Iranian human wave attacks.  These conventional methods were, 
by no means, exhausted, but one may argue that the use of chemical weapons was a last resort 
option for Saddam in his war against Iran.  Had he not used chemical weapons, Iran may have 
pushed the final few miles to Basra in 1984, 1985, 1986, or 1987 or Baghdad at many times 
during the war as Tehran tried to cut off the highway connecting the two cities but succumbed to 
poison gas attacks at places like the Majnoon Islands (1984), Mandali in 1986, or Sumer and 
Mehran in 1987.106 
It is important to note at no point in this argument is the use of chemical weapons 
condoned.  Saddam Hussein’s poison gas attacks are a clear violation of the 1925 Geneva 
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Protocol and a heinous crime against humanity, specifically the attacks against innocent Iranian 
and Iraqi civilians.  The argument of Saddam’s use of poison gas as a last resort only applies to 
the Iran-Iraq War as an international conflict.  This time the argument excludes the internal fight 
against the Kurds that resulted in the attack on Halabja in 1988.  The use of chemical weapons in 
that situation is and will forever be condemned as genocide by the author of this thesis.  Also 
deserving of condemnation is the inaction of the United States who turned a blind eye to 
Saddam’s continued use of chemical weapons that encouraged him to resort to the method to 
solve all conflicts, even internal ones.  The United Nations Security Council is also to blame as it 
consistently adopted non-binding resolutions under Chapter Six of the United Nations Charter 
when Chapter Seven was an option that would have brought about the desired ceasefire much 
more efficiently.  The European powers and other nations around the globe that sold Baghdad the 
precursors to the chemical weapons he utilized throughout the war are also not free from 
criticism.  Finally, Tehran and the Ayatollah Khomeini must take responsibility for the 
continuation of the war, the human-wave attacks that resulted in the need for a new response 
from Iraq, the stubborn and unrealistic demands sent to Baghdad, and the refusal to accept any 
ceasefire unless those demands were met.   
For eight years, Saddam attempted to end the war, but declined Iran’s demands out of 
pride.  For eight years, Tehran refused to accept UN and Saddam-led ceasefires, and continued to 
raise the death toll through aggressive offensives.  For eight years the United Nations failed to 
effectively regulate international conflict.  For eight years the United States made poor decisions 
in regards to the war, often protecting their own backs rather than performing their job as a 
permanent member of the Security Council.  For these reasons it is easier to understand why 
Saddam chose to use chemical weapons in the first place, why he believed he had the green light 
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to continue their use, why he grew accustomed to using the method to solve his problems, and 
why he gained the confidence to invade Kuwait.  Again, these actions are not condoned, 
however, through these chapters it is hoped the reader has been able to take into account all of 
the moving pieces behind the leaders’ decisions.  Although the war ended with a ceasefire and 
return to ante bellum status, and may appear to have been inconsequential, the lessons learned by 
the international community have incredible military, diplomatic, and humanitarian impacts.   
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